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1.

Introduction

Despite legal prohibitions on trading by corporate insiders who have material undisclosed
information, many U.S. and Canadian firms also have private insider trading policies (ITPs) that
restrict trading by their executives and other employees. In many cases, these ITPs are more
stringent than the host country’s insider trading laws. Although insider trading laws are the
subject of several recent comparative empirical studies (see, e.g., Beny, 2005, 2007a, 2007b,
2008; Bhattacharya and Daouk, 2002; Bris, 2005; Bushman et al., 2005; Maug and Ackerman,
2006; Durnev and Nain, 2007; Korczak and Lasfer, 2006; Fernandes and Ferreira, 2007), very
few studies examine firms’ voluntary regulation of insider trading through ITPs (see, e.g. Bettis
et al, 2000; Roulstone, 2003). Bettis et al. (2000) find that voluntary insider trading policies are
widespread in the United States. Ninety-two percent of their sample firms have an ITP and 78%
of these firms have an ITP that is more stringent than U.S. insider trading laws. Similarly, as we
demonstrate in this article, a significant proportion of publicly-traded Canadian firms have
private ITPs. These, too, are frequently more restrictive than Canadian insider trading laws.
ITPs are interesting in part because they implicate an influential empirical claim in the
law and economics literature on insider trading, namely that shareholders seldom, if ever,
negotiated corporate contracts banning insider trading when it was legal (Carlton and Fischel,
1983). Some scholars argue that the absence of such contracts proves that shareholders did not
object to insider trading and thus the prohibition of insider trading is unnecessary and even
efficiency reducing (Carlton and Fischel, 1983). 1 One may wonder why firms voluntarily adopt

1

Some American legal scholars argue that the fact that there were few private contracts prohibiting insider
trading in the United States prior to the legal prohibition suggests that firms and shareholders had no desire to
restrict insider trading (Carlton and Fischel 1983). From this, they conclude that insider trading is not inefficient.
These scholars implicitly dismiss the possibility that shareholders lacked the capacity to negotiate such contracts
because of information deficiencies, asymmetric bargaining power, and insider self-dealing (Cox 1986; Easterbrook
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ITPs when insider trading is already illegal, and especially if firms did not privately restrict
insider trading when it was legal.
There are at least four explanations for why firms establish ITPs. The first and most
obvious explanation is that firms may adopt ITPs to demonstrate legal compliance and thus avoid
corporate liability, since having an ITP in place may shield a corporation from insider trading
liability (Jagolinzer and Roulstone, 2007; Bettis et al., 2000), as we explain below. This
explanation resolves the apparent inconsistency between the claim that firms did not desire to
restrict insider trading when it was legal and the fact that many firms privately restrict insider
trading now that it is illegal. Specifically, firms would not adopt an ITP but for the prohibition
of insider trading. Second, firms may adopt ITPs to reduce trading costs and thus increase the
liquidity of their shares, since evidence suggests that insider trading increases trading costs
(Bhattacharya and Daouk, 2002; Beny, 2005; Copeland and Galai, 1983; Glosten and Harris,
1988). Third, firms may adopt ITPs to reduce agency costs, i.e., the costs that arise from the
divergence of interests between managers and shareholders and the consequent need for
shareholders to monitor managers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Several proponents of insider
trading restrictions argue that insider trading distorts managers’ and dominant shareholders
incentives to the detriment of corporate value small outside shareholders (see., e.g, Kraakman,
1991; Maug, 2002). The first explanation, the compliance/liability avoidance rationale, does not
necessarily imply that firms perceive insider trading per se to be economically harmful. In
contrast, the second and third explanations suggest that firms privately restrict insider trading to
enhance economic efficiency and thus challenge the twin claims that firms do not dislike insider
1985). Thus, they ignore the possibility that the absence of a ban made stock markets and firms less efficient than
they otherwise might have been. In addition, contractual restrictions would probably be unenforceable absent
regulatory intervention. Computerized surveillance is required to detect insider trading and public (or quasi-public)
regulators have access to such technology, while corporations generally are not in the business of trade surveillance,
let alone self-reporting of insider trading violations.

4
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trading and would not restrict it but for the law. These explanations are not mutually exclusive,
and a firm may adopt an ITP for one or more of the foregoing reasons.
Alternatively, ITPs may be mere “window dressing”, if they are costless for firms to
enact and publicize. Under the window dressing rationale, firms adopt toothless ITPs solely to
curry favor with outside investors, who may misguidedly view insider trading as unfair or
immoral. The work of Bettis et al. (2000) suggests that ITPs are effective, however. Bettis and
his co-authors find that even in the U.S., where insider trading laws are vigorously enforced,
ITPs suppress insider trading. 2 They find that bid-ask spreads are lower, i.e., liquidity is higher,
during black-out periods, i.e., periods in which insiders are forbidden to trade pursuant to an ITP.
Their results suggest that U.S. firms adopt ITPs at least partly for economic reasons. Bettis and
his co-authors take ITPs as given, however, and do not investigate whether some firms are more
inclined to adopt ITPs or more stringent ITPs than other firms. Roulstone (2003) does
investigate firm-level determinants of private restrictions on insider trading and finds that larger
firms and firms with greater analyst following (publicity), greater institutional ownership, and
past experience of a lawsuit for insider trading are more likely to adopt private insider trading
restrictions. Like Bettis et al. (2000), though, Roulstone does not exploit variation in ITP
stringency across firms.
In this pilot study, we take the next steps and investigate firm-level determinants of both
ITP existence and ITP stringency. Investigating why firms differ in their proclivity to adopt both
ITPs and ITPs of varying stringency will, we hope, illuminate firms’ motives for adopting ITPs
and thus inform the insider trading debate. We develop five testable hypotheses based on the
assumption that firms that face greater costs from insider trading (or greater benefits from

2

Indeed, Bettis et al. (2000) suggest that ITPs and public enforcement may be more effective at suppressing
insider trading than public enforcement alone.
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restricting insider trading) will be more inclined than other firms to adopt ITPs and ITPs that are
more restrictive than existing insider trading law. As explained in greater detail below, we
hypothesize that ITPs and ITP stringency are positively associated with: (1) firm size, (2) a
firm’s market-to-book ratio, (3) concentrated share ownership/control, (4) firm-specific stock
return volatility, and (5) cross-listing on a U.S. stock exchange.
We investigate our hypotheses using a sample of 181 firms that were included in the
Toronto Stock Exchange/Standard & Poor’s (TSX/S&P) Index as of December 31, 2005. The
TSX is Canada’s largest stock exchange, accounting for over 80% of Canada’s equity trading
volume between 1987 and 2000 (McNally and Smith, 2003). For each firm in our sample, we
examine whether the firm has an ITP and the substance of the firm’s ITP, if one exists, including
whether it is more stringent than Canadian insider trading law. We use firm-specific
characteristics to test our predictions about the kinds of firms that are likely to establish ITPs
and, for the adopting group, the relative strictness of the firm’s ITP. We are able to test our
hypotheses because not all TSX-listed firms have an ITP and, among those that do have such a
policy, these policies vary in their degree of stringency relative to Canadian insider trading law.
The Canadian stock market is a useful context in which to test our hypotheses for several
reasons. First, as we elaborate in greater detail below, insider trading enforcement is relatively
lax in Canada. If firms view insider trading as economically harmful, this ought to give
Canadian firms an incentive to adopt ITPs, and possibly ITPs that are more stringent than
Canadian insider trading law. Conversely, if firms view insider trading as economically
beneficial, lax enforcement ought to create an incentive for Canadian firms to forego ITPs or
confine them to what the law requires. Second, Canadian firms tend to have more concentrated
share ownership, and thus a greater prevalence of controlling shareholders (who are often

6
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2007

5

Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009, Art. 77 [2007]

insiders), than U.S. firms (Daniels and Iacobucci, 1999; Daniels and Morck, 1995). Controlling
shareholders are more able to engage in insider trading than other shareholders because of their
ready access to private information (Maug 2002; Bhide 1993; Demsetz 1986). Lax enforcement
and a greater prevalence of controlling shareholders suggests that insider trading may be
relatively prevalent in Canada. Finally, since insider trading laws are more vigorously enforced
in the U.S. than in Canada, Canadian firms cross-listed in the U.S. may adopt ITPs to avoid
insider trading liability in the U.S. Cross-listed Canadian firms may also view having an ITP as
gratuitous advertising in Canada of conditions that they have a strong incentive to adhere to in
the U.S., which would support the window dressing rationale in Canada and the
compliance/liability avoidance rationale in the U.S.
We find that most of the firms in our sample (80%) have an ITP and just less than half
(44%) of these firms have an ITP that is more restrictive than Canadian insider trading law.
Thus, voluntary ITPs are common among firms on the TSX/S&P Index. In addition, our results
corroborate four of our five hypotheses, a striking outcome in light of our relatively small sample
size. First, the larger is the firm, the greater the likelihood it has an ITP and the more stringent
its ITP is likely to be. Second, the more controlling shareholders a firm has, the more likely it is
to have both an ITP and an ITP that is stricter than Canadian insider trading law. Third, firms
with greater firm-specific stock return volatility are more apt to have both ITPs and more
stringent ITPs than firms with lower firm-specific return volatility. Fourth, firms cross-listed on
a U.S. stock exchange are more likely than those not cross-listed on a U.S. stock exchange to
have an ITP and one more stringent than what Canadian law requires. Our data fail to support
only one of our five hypotheses, the market-to-book hypothesis.

7
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Our results suggest that neither window dressing, legal compliance/liability avoidance,
nor U.S. regulatory imperialism fully explains Canadian firms’ adoption of ITPs. TSX/S&P
firms display a range of private approaches to insider trading that roughly correlate, we argue,
with the private costs and benefits of restricting insider trading. Thus, our findings suggest that
at least some firms wish to control insider trading for economic, i.e., efficiency reasons.
Importantly, our results also suggest that some shareholders, and influential ones at that, oppose
insider trading. Furthermore, our results suggest that formal organizational rules may dominate
private sanctions in producing our results, which corroborates a normative theory of
organizational rules as opposed to an economic deterrence theory. On balance, our findings
support, even if they do not prove, the claim that firms perceive insider trading to be inimical to
their interests.
The remainder of the article fills out these points. Part 2 discusses the motivation for this
study and briefly reviews relevant literature. Part 3 describes Canadian law and recommended
best practices on insider trading and highlights the more important differences between the
Canadian and U.S. insider trading regimes. Part 4 presents in more detail our hypotheses
regarding the kinds of firms that are likely to have an ITP or an ITP that is stricter than Canadian
insider trading law. Part 5 describes our data and empirical methodology and presents the
results. Finally, Part 6 concludes.
2.

Motivation and Literature Review
Even though insider trading is generally illegal (Bhattacharya and Daouk 2002), the

debate among legal and financial scholars about whether insider trading ought to be regulated
has persisted since the 1960s. What is at stake in the debate is the appropriate allocation of

8
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rights to benefit from corporate information (Macey 1991). 3 The question legal scholars pose is
whether such rights ought to be available equally to the firm/outside shareholders or whether
corporate insiders ought to benefit exclusively from their privileged access to such information.
The fact that insider trading is illegal, at least on the books, in virtually every country with a
stock market suggests that lawmakers around the world, unlike some scholars, believe the better
policy is to make rights to trade on corporate information more equally available. 4
In the early years, the debate centered on whether insider trading is unfair to public
investors not privy to private corporate information (Schotland 1967; see also Brudney 1979). In
the late 1960s, the terms of the debate shifted from the fairness of insider trading to its economic
efficiency when Professor Manne published his influential book, Insider Trading and the Stock
Market, in which he argued that insider trading is efficient and hence desirable. He justified his
conclusion by arguing that the ability to engage in insider trading motivates insiders to be more
entrepreneurial and leads to more accurate stock prices, i.e., stock prices that reflect all current
information about a stock’s “true” value and not merely public information (Manne 1966).
As the debate on the efficiency of insider trading continued, a third position emerged.
This intermediate position maintains that insider trading is efficient for some firms and
inefficient for others (Epstein 2004; Haddock and Macey 1987). Proponents of the intermediate
position believe that corporate efficiency would be maximized if regulators allowed firms,
shareholders and corporate insiders to contract privately over whether to allow or prohibit insider
trading within a firm. The market, they maintain, will ensure that the appropriate bargain will be
3

Macey (1991) likens this right to a property right in corporate information. However, it is not exactly a
property right because insiders cannot summon the law to protect corporate information from others, even when
trading on inside information is legal. Likewise, outsiders cannot use the law to monopolize such information.
Arrow’s (1962) characterization of business information as a public good is a more apt description, though like
many other public goods some parties are in a far better position to exploit it. See Beny (2007b) for a political
economy analysis of insider trading legislation and enforcement.
4
Lawmakers have rejected full equality of access, however, probably because of the infeasibility and
probable inefficiency of full equality. See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
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struck for each firm, prohibiting insider trading by contract in cases where it is inefficient and
allowing insider trading where it is efficient (Haddock and Macey 1987; Carlton and Fischel
1983).
This theoretical debate resists resolution because, as noted above, we live in a world
where insider trading is illegal in virtually every stock market. Thus, in a departure from the
pure Coasian theme, ITPs are adopted in the shadow of insider trading laws. This means that
ITPs are skewed toward greater strictness than existing law because if they are less strict, they
add nothing to the law’s rigor and may even create legal liability. Thus, U.S. and Canadian ITPs
are left-censored, i.e., they are either equally or more restrictive, and are never more permissive,
than what the respective insider trading laws require. Still, ITPs are somewhat like contractual
choices to prohibit insider trading, except that companies seem to adopt them unilaterally and
they do not spring from direct negotiations between insiders and outside shareholders. We aim
to understand the firm-level determinants of these quasi-contractual choices in relation to
Canadian insider trading law and thereby inform the perennial theoretical debate.
This article contributes to the recent wave of comparative empirical research on insider
trading regulation, by focusing on the Canadian stock market, which is heavily influenced by
economic and regulatory events in U.S. This recent scholarship attempts to understand the
economic (efficiency) consequences of insider trading laws by exploiting statistical variation in
such laws across countries. 5 Thus far, the evidence seems to support the regulatory stance rather
than the deregulatory position. Beny (2007a, 2005) reports that more stringent insider trading
laws are associated with more dispersed equity ownership, more accurate stock prices, and
greater stock market liquidity. Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002), using data from all countries
5

Although it is not possible to compare markets without regulation to markets with regulation, since insider
trading is illegal in almost every stock market, it is possible to compare markets with varying degrees of regulation
and enforcement. This is what the recent literature does.
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with stock markets, find that stock market liquidity systematically increased after insider trading
regulation was enacted and the cost of equity fell significantly after the first incidence of
enforcement. Bushman et al. (2005) find that investment analyst attention, which is widely
thought to be beneficial to stock market efficiency, increases after a country enforces its insider
trading laws. Beny (2008) finds that insider trading laws are associated with greater corporate
valuation among firms with a controlling shareholder in common law countries. Finally, Bris
(2005) finds that insider trading profits prior to tender offer announcements decrease with the
stringency of insider trading laws (as coded by Beny 2005).
Our research also contributes to the recent empirical literature on voluntary corporate
governance. The bulk of this literature investigates whether firm performance is affected by
voluntary governance practices (Coles et al, 2000; Doidge, Karolyi and Stultz, 2003; Black, Jang
and Kim, 2005). There is relatively less focus on which factors predict a firm’s adoption of
governance standards. Durnev and Kim (2005), however, examine this issue. They find that
investment opportunities, external financing, and ownership structure significantly influence
voluntary governance practices and that the strength of their influence depends in part on a
country’s legal environment. In addition, Anand, Milne and Purda (2006) find that many
Canadian firms voluntarily adopt governance practices over and above those required by
Canadian corporate legislation and the number of Canadian firms voluntarily adopting such
practices is increasing. Anand and her co-authors also find that it is not only the home country’s
governance regime that influences the stringency of the governance practices adopted but also
the corporate governance standards of the United States, where many Canadian firms seek
external finance. Since ITPs are essentially voluntary corporate governance standards, this
article contributes to this literature as well as to the comparative literature on insider trading. By

11
http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art77

10

Anand and Beny:

exploring the characteristics that lead Canadian firms to adopt ITPs, we illuminate how firm
characteristics affect an important subset of corporate governance rules.
A Comparison between the Canadian and U.S. Insider Trading Regimes

3.

Canada does not have a national securities regulator (Wise Person’s Committee, 2003).
Thus, securities laws, including insider trading laws, are enacted and enforced at the provincial
level, unlike in the U.S. where securities laws are federally enacted and enforced. In this section,
we focus on the insider trading law of the province of Ontario, which is home to both the
Toronto Stock Exchange, where our sample firms are listed, and Canada’s largest capital
markets. 6
In Ontario, the basic rules on insider trading are set forth in statutes that define both legal
and illegal insider trading. 7 Insiders (a defined class) may trade, provided that their trades are
not based on undisclosed (non-public) material information and are reported within ten days
from the date of the trade. The relevant legal provision states, “No person or company in a
special relationship with a reporting issuer shall purchase or sell securities of the reporting issuer
with the knowledge of a material fact or material change with respect to the reporting issuer that
has not been generally disclosed”. The precise legal elements of illegal insider trading in
Ontario are thus: a) a special relationship between the insider and the issuing corporation; b)
material information; and c) undisclosed information. Tipping, defined as informing any other
person of undisclosed material information other than in the necessary course of business, is also

6

We do not present the insider trading laws of all of Canada’s thirteen jurisdictions, since Ontario insider
trading law applies to our sample firms and, at any rate, insider trading laws across Canada are generally
harmonized and therefore similar, if not identical, to Ontario insider trading law.
7
Section 107 and section 76, Securities Act (Ontario), R.S.O 1990.
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prohibited under the statute. 8 Appendix 1 contains a description of the statutory provisions
relating to insider trading in the province of Ontario.
While Canadian firms are not legally required to adopt an ITP, it is a recommended best
practice for them to do so. National Policy 51-101, “Disclosure Standards”, contains best
practices relating to disclosure, and recommends that firms: appoint a senior officer to approve
and monitor trading by all insiders, prohibit insiders and employees from trading while in
possession of material non-public information, specify blackout periods (explicit periods during
which all trading is prohibited) that apply to insiders, officers and employees, 9 and establish
procedures by which insiders, officers and employees must apply for approval to trade during
blackout periods. While not a recommended best practice per se, firms may also adopt internal
(i.e., private) enforcement or disciplinary mechanisms in their ITPs consisting of such measures
as unpaid leave, suspension or even dismissal for those who violate the rules.
In addition to the foregoing recommended best practice, National Policy 58-201 sets forth
various corporate governance guidelines (as opposed to mandatory rules), including a
recommendation that boards adopt a “code of business conduct and ethics.” 10 As we note
below, some Canadian firms choose to implement an ITP as part of this code. Although
Canadian firms are not required to adopt such a code, once a firm adopts one, it must file the

8

Section 76(1)-(5), Securities Act (Ontario).
A blackout period, for example, may extend from one month before the firm’s earnings release – the period
in which the firm is preparing its financial statements, management discussion and analysis (MD&A) and other
material, non-public information – to two days after the firm publicly issues its earnings release – to give the market
time to disseminate and incorporate the new information into the firm’s share price (see, e.g., Jagolinzer and
Roulstone, 2007; Roulstone, 2003; Bettis et al., 2000). ITPs may also contain a brownout period, a period during
which some but not all insiders are restricted from trading. For example, an ITP may bar the persons who are part of
a “deal team” working on a significant transaction involving the firm from trading until the deal is publicly
disclosed.
10
National Instrument 58-201 “Corporate Governance Practices” online
http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/Regulation/Rulemaking/Current/Part5/rule_20041029_58-201_corp-gov-guidelines.jsp..
9
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code and disclosure regarding the code’s contents is mandatory. 11 However, particulars of the
ITP may not be included in such disclosure. Most importantly, the choice whether to adopt an
ITP is ultimately voluntary in Canada. None of the post-Sarbanes Oxley corporate governance
legislation implemented in Canada requires firms to adopt an ITP. 12 In addition, relative to other
optional corporate governance standards, Canadian securities regulators have not pressed firms
to adopt these policies. 13
U.S. insider trading laws differ from Canadian insider trading laws in several respects.
First, as noted above, Canadian provincial securities statutes explicitly forbid insiders from
purchasing or selling securities based on material information which has not been publicly
disclosed. By contrast, in the U.S., Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is a
general anti-fraud provision that prohibits the use of “any device, scheme, or artifice” or any
“act, practice or course of business” to defraud or deceive “in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security” (17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5). On its face, Rule 10b-5, which we reproduce in
Appendix 1, does not prohibit insider trading. Since the 1960s, however, U.S. courts have
consistently interpreted the rule as prohibiting corporate insiders from trading on the basis of
material, nonpublic information unless they publicly disclose such information prior to trading. 14

11

National Instrument 58-101 – Disclosure of Corporate Governance Practices and Form 58-101F1Corporate Governance Disclosure, (2005) 28 OSCB 5377. The voluntary nature of the Canadian regime suggests
that our results may understate the prevalence of voluntary ITPs among Canadian firms, to the extent that some
firms that have such policies have chosen not to report them. We will address this issue in a subsequent study by
directly asking firms whether they have an ITP and for its contents, if they have one. In this article, we will rely on
publicly reported information.
12
In 2004, subsequent to the Sarbanes-Oxley reforms in the U.S., Canadian securities regulators adopted
mandatory corporate governance rules requiring certification of financial statements and audit committee
composition. Multilateral Instrument 52-109- Certification of Disclosure in Issuers’ Annual and Interim Filing
(2004) 27 OSCB 3230 as amended in (2005) 28 OSCB 4979; Multilateral Instrument 52-110 – Audit Committees
(2004) 27 OSCB 3252 as amended in (2005) 28 OSCB 5387.
13
In a few cases, however, the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) required the firm to adopt an ITP in a
legal settlement of insider trading claims against the firm. See, e.g., In the Matter of Zoran Popovic and
Dxstorm.com Inc. (2005).
14
This is the so-called “disclose or abstain” rule. A seminal early case was SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,
401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). U.S. federal case law treats insider trading as a

14
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Effectively, then, the basic Canadian and U.S. insider trading prohibitions are the same, even
though the U.S. prohibition does not explicitly address insider trading as such. In both countries,
insiders may trade their firms’ securities if such trading is not based on material undisclosed
information. In addition, in both countries, insiders must disclose changes in the ownership of
their positions, including all purchases and dispositions of the firm’s securities.
Second, short-swing profits are permissible in Canada but prohibited in the U.S. In the
U.S., Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires an insider who buys (sells)
the securities of the issuer and sells (buys) them within six months to give the resulting profits to
the company (17 C.F.R. § 240.16(b), reproduced in Appendix 1). 15 Section 16(b), unlike Rule
10b-5, covers only directors, officers, or stockholders owning more than 10% of the firm’s
shares. In addition, as a prophylactic rule, Section 16(b) applies regardless of whether an insider
trades on immaterial or public information, arguably over-deterring trading by corporate
insiders. 16 In contrast, Canada does not prohibit short-swing profits. Moreover, foreign firms
(including Canadian firms) that are cross-listed in the U.S. are exempt from Section 16(b).
Third, U.S. and Canadian insider trading laws differ in how they define an “insider”. In
Canada, the insider trading prohibition applies to individuals who are in a “special relationship”
with the firm. The statutory definition of special relationship in Canadian law is broad and
includes a number of persons who would not fall under the U.S.’s formal definition of
violation of common law fiduciary duties. See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980) and Dirks v.
SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
15
It is straightforward to see how an insider might profit from buying and then selling her company’s shares
within a six-month period. A profit will result if she buys the shares at a lower price than the price at which she
subsequently sells them. It is less obvious how she might profit from selling and then buying her company’s shares
within a six month period. A “profit” will result, however, in the form of “loss avoidance,” if she sells the shares at
a higher price than the price at which she subsequently buys them back. For example, if the insider sells the shares
on January 1 for $20 and then buys them back on March 1 for $5, she will have avoided a loss of $15. Another way
in which she might profit from a sell-buy transaction is by selling the shares short (i.e., borrowing the shares and
then selling them) at the current market price which is higher than the price at which she subsequently will buy them
back in order to return the shares to the lender and close the contract. Insiders are prohibited from short-selling in
the U.S. under Section 16(b), but not in Canada (Anita: please confirm this).
16
For a critique of Section 16(b) from a Canadian perspective, see Davies (1975).
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“insider”. 17 In the U.S., Section 16(a)(1) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 indirectly
defines insiders as officers, directors and 10% shareholders. 18 Although this definition is not as
broad as its Canadian statutory counterpart, U.S. case law articulates a broad range of additional
individuals who are subject to the basic insider trading prohibition. For example, tippees are
prohibited from trading in the U.S., even though they are neither insiders nor in any special
relationship with the firm (see, e.g., Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983)). In addition, U.S. case
law extends the insider trading prohibition to so-called “constructive” or “secondary” insiders, a
class that includes the firm’s lawyers, investment bankers, accountants, and others in possession
of confidential corporate information (see, e.g., Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983); SEC v. Lund,
623 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1980)). Finally, the misappropriation theory, an American judicial
doctrine, extends the insider trading prohibition to persons who do not have a fiduciary duty to
the firm or its shareholders, but who have a fiduciary duty to the source of the information (see,
e.g., United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997)). Thus, there is little effective difference
between Canada and the U.S. concerning the scope of the basic insider trading prohibition.
Finally, unlike in Canada, it is not a recommended best practice for U.S. firms to adopt
ITPs. Nevertheless, U.S. law provides a strong incentive for firms to adopt private codes
governing insider trading because under Section 20A of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934
(“The Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988”) a firm may be held
derivatively liable for its employees’ illegal insider trading unless the firm can prove that it acted
in good faith and did not induce such trading. One way a firm can provide evidence of good
17

Insiders include not only people in a special relationship with the firm but also parties making a takeover
bid or engaged in some other proposed transaction with the issuer. Directors, officers and employees are considered
insiders, as are individuals who learned of a material fact or change from any of these individuals. Insiders include
any person who learns of a material fact or change from anyone described in the statutory definition and who should
have known that the person from whom she received such information was in a special relationship with the issuer.
(Anita: can you add citation to statutory provision?)
18
Moreover, Rule 16a-1(f) defines "officer”.
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faith and non-inducement is to show that it had an ITP in place prior to the alleged illegal trading
and that the employees traded in spite of the internal prohibition (e.g., a blackout period), as in
the ImClone case.
The most important distinction between the U.S. and Canadian insider trading regimes by
far is enforcement. The U.S. has both a longer history and greater intensity of insider trading
enforcement than Canada. The Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) conducted its first insider
trading prosecution in 1973, while the first U.S. insider trading case occurred more than a decade
earlier. Since then, there have been few insider trading convictions and no successful tipping
convictions 19 in Canada (McNally and Smith, 2003). According to McNally and Smith (2003),
“[o]n average, there has been less than one insider trading conviction a year since 1980 [and]
only two cases where insiders were charged with failure to report their trading activity.” By
comparison, over the same period the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) settled
or prosecuted over 550 insider trading cases (McNally and Smith, 2003). Two reasons for the
difficulty of obtaining insider trading convictions in Canada (especially in cases brought in
provincial court) are the relatively high burden of proving scienter (Davies, 1975; Canadian
Insider Trading Task Force, 2003) and apparent ambiguities in interpreting the applicable
materiality standard. 20 Another reason is Canada’s relatively thin budget for insider trading
enforcement (Wise Person’s Committee, 2003).
The U.S. and Canadian comparative insider trading enforcement patterns are consistent
with their general comparative securities enforcement experiences (Wise Person’s Committee,
2003; Jackson, 2006). Jackson (2006) compares U.S. and Canadian enforcement budgets and

19

R. v. Rankin, [2006] O.J. No. 4579 (Sup. Ct. Just., Nordheimer J., 9 November 2006), overturning [2005] O.J.
No. 3202 (Ont. Ct. Just., Khawly J.). Anita: can you elaborate on this footnote? Is this the successful tipping case
that was overturned on appeal.
20
The key recent Canadian case highlighting these substantive issues is R. v Felderhof 2007 ONCJ 345.
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staffing levels and “enforcement intensity”, which he defines as “the frequency and severity with
which a country’s legal regime imposes sanctions on capital market participants.” He finds that
“Canadian enforcement activity is less intensive [in many areas] than U.S. enforcement activity”
(Jackson, 2006 at 82). Between 2002 and 2004, the differences between the two countries were
“so huge that they swamp[ed] any possible scaling adjustment [for market size].” While public
enforcement activity in Canada has increased in recent years, Jackson reports that it is still lower
than U.S. activity even taking into account scaling issues. Jackson’s findings suggest that
Canadian firms cross-listed in the U.S. face a greate threat of enforcement than non-cross-listed
Canadian firms.
Because of lax public enforcement and the rarity of private 21 enforcement, insider trading
is thought to be quite rampant in Canada (The Globe and Mail, 2001; Canadian Insider Trading
Task Force, 2003). Indeed, McNally and Smith (2003) present “large-scale” evidence of insider
trading and reporting violations in Canada. Similarly, Bris (2005) finds that insider trading
profits prior to the public announcement of mergers are the highest in Canada among the 52
countries in his study. Thus, if Canadian firms perceive insider trading as economically harmful,
they ought to be inclined to enact private restrictions via ITPs. We empirically investigate this
issue in Part 5, after presenting our testable hypotheses and methodology in Part 4.
4.

Hypotheses and Empirical Methodology

Hypotheses

21

Theoretically, shareholders may privately enforce Canadian insider trading legislation by bringing bring
class action lawsuits. Shareholder class actions are rare in Canada, however, mainly because of the rejection of the
“fraud on the market” doctrine in Ontario (Carom v Bre-X (1998)). Canadian shareholders in theory may also
launch an oppression remedy stemming from breach of an ITP by insiders. Corporate statutes in Canadian
provinces allow complainants to apply to a court for an order that would remedy any action of a corporation, its
affiliates or its directors that is "oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to or that unfairly disregards the interests of any
security holder, creditor, director or officer.” To our knowledge, however, such a case (i.e., for breach of an ITP) has
never been brought.
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A point forcefully made by some in the insider trading debate is that firms did not
voluntarily prohibit insider trading prior to its legal prohibition (Carlton and Fischel, 1983).
From this observation, some scholars conclude that firms generally desire (or do not disapprove
of) insider trading (see, e.g., Carlton and Fischel, 1983). It is true that most firms did not
voluntarily prohibit insider trading prior to legal intervention, but the argument from history
would be compelling only if markets were perfectly efficient, and even then it may not apply to
the situation today. Markets are not, however, perfectly efficient, and the reality is that many
U.S. and Canadian firms do voluntarily prohibit insider trading through ITPs, which supplement
mandatory insider trading laws. In the empirical portion of this paper we shall examine the
characteristics of firms that do and do not adopt ITPs as well as identify the types of firms most
likely to go beyond what the law requires in enacting ITPs. This analysis does not directly
examine the efficiency of insider trading regulation but does bear on it and suggests, as we
explain below, that at least some firms and shareholders do not perceive unregulated insider
trading as efficient.
For the purpose of predicting which firm characteristics are associated with the adoption
of an ITP, we assume that, other things equal, a firm is more likely to have an ITP and, if it has
one, to have one stricter than what Canadian law requires: (1) the greater the opportunity for
insider trading, (2) the greater the potential costs of insider trading, and (3) the greater the
potential benefits from preventing insider trading. These assumptions motivate our specific
hypotheses, which, in summary form, are that ITP existence and ITP stringency are positively
associated with: (1) firm size, (2) a firm’s market-to-book ratio, (3) concentrated share
ownership/control, (4) firm-specific stock return volatility, and (5) cross-listing on a U.S. stock
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exchange. Before turning to our data and analysis, we explain these hypothesized relationships
in greater detail.
Hypothesis 1: Larger firms are more likely to have an ITP than smaller firms
There are several reasons, not mutually exclusive, why larger firms may be more likely to
have an ITP than smaller firms. First, as Bettis et al. (2000) suggest, larger firms are likely to
have greater numbers of insiders than smaller firms, making insider trading a more salient issue
for the former than for the latter. Second, “[l]arger firms are more likely [than smaller firms] to
have the organizational [or bureaucratic] ability to monitor and restrict insiders” (Roulstone,
2003, p. 544). Thus, building ITP monitoring and enforcement into organizational procedures
will be easier for larger firms than for smaller firms. Third, larger firms tend to have more
powerful outside shareholders (e.g., pension funds) than smaller firms (O’Brien and Bhushan,
1990), so insider trading may occur at the expense of more powerful outside interests in the
former firms. Finally, larger firms face a higher level of public scrutiny from analysts and the
broader investing public than smaller firms (O’Brien and Bhushan, 1990), suggesting that they
are more susceptible to negative publicity stemming from the perceived unfairness and potential
criminality of insider trading. This can harm a firm’s image and its business generally.
Demonstrating compliance or super-compliance 22 with insider trading laws by adopting an ITP
may make a firm more attractive to investors who know that corporate scandals can lead to sharp
falls in share prices. Relatedly, larger firms may see themselves as business leaders and, as ITPs
are considered best practices, may want to jump on that bandwagon. Greater public scrutiny
may also motivate larger firms to adopt ITPs they do not intend to enforce merely for window
dressing purposes.

22

We shall use this term to refer to ITPs that are more restrictive than Canadian law.
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In addition, larger firms may be more likely than smaller firms to possess other
characteristics that we expect to be associated with compliant and super-compliant ITPs – crosslisting on a U.S. exchange, for example. But we are only concerned here with associations net of
other variables in our model.
Hypothesis 2: Firms with higher market-to-book ratios are more likely to have compliant or
super-compliant ITPs than firms with lower market-to-book ratios
We predict that firms with higher market-to-book ratios – stock price relative to book
value per share 23 – are more likely to adopt ITPs because they tend to have greater asymmetric
information and growth opportunities, both of which increase insider trading opportunities.
These firms tend to have a greater proportion of intangible assets, like intellectual property,
which makes it harder for outsiders to evaluate them and gives insiders a distinct informational
advantage vis-à-vis outsiders, thus increasing the potential profitability of insider trading. On the
contrary, a mature business with a lower growth profile and predictable earnings present fewer
opportunities for insider trading. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, Bettis et al. (2000) find that
insider trading activity is positively related to a firm’s market-to-book ratio. Thus, if firms see
insider trading as harmful to their interests, they ought to be even more inclined to do so the
higher their market-to-book ratio. On the other hand, if powerful insiders are rent seekers or
believe insider trading enhances corporate efficiency, they ought to be less likely to complement
the law’s restrictions by enacting ITPs. For hypothesis testing purposes, we assume firms are, in
most cases, motivated to control insider trading.

23

A high market-to-book ratio means that the company’s market valuation is greater than the value of its
assets. Firms with high market-to-book ratios tend to have a greater degree of intellectual property, which is
inherently more speculative and thus more difficult to value than physical assets.
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Hypothesis 3: Firms with more concentrated share ownership/control are more likely to
have compliant or super-compliant ITPs than firms with less concentrated share
ownership/control
As an initial matter, one may wonder why ITPs that restrict trading by insiders would
even be relevant to controlling shareholders. 24 Like insider trading laws, however, ITPs prohibit
insiders from tipping outsiders, which includes controlling shareholders who may otherwise
solicit tips from insiders. In addition, in Canada, many controlling shareholders are also officers
(e.g., the CEO who owns 20% of the firm’s voting shares) or directors (Daniels and Morck,
1995) and thus subject to ITPs. Thus, controlling shareholders are at least indirectly subject to
ITPs and may be directly subject to them as well if they are also corporate officers or directors.
As with Hypothesis 2, one could argue that this factor should diminish rather than increase
efforts to control insider trading. Demsetz (1986) and Bhide (1993), for example, argue that
concentrated ownership is desirable because large shareholders engage in valuable corporate
monitoring, reducing agency costs. Furthermore, because of their greater ownership stake, large
shareholders have greater access to inside information and are able to make superior trading
profits relative to other shareholders (Demsetz, 1986; Bhide, 1993). These profits, in the view of
these theorists, are not windfalls, but rather compensate large shareholders for their monitoring
activities and for the risks attendant to holding undiversified portfolios (Demsetz, 1986; Bhide,
1993). Restricting such compensation by prohibiting insider trading may reduce their incentives
to monitor (Demsetz, 1986; Bhide, 1993), by raising the costs and liabilities of active
shareholding and monitoring (Bhide, 1993). 25 This implies that firms that value large

24

In Canada, controlling shareholders are legally classified as insiders if they hold 10% or more of the firm’s
voting securities. Section 1.1, Securities Act (Ontario).
25
Both Demsetz (1986) and Bhide (1993) oppose insider trading restrictions for precisely this reason.
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shareholder monitoring may shun ITPs or adopt ITPs that exempt dominant shareholders who
are corporate outsiders.
In contrast, Maug (2002) worries that large shareholders will serve their own interests at
the expense of minority shareholders if they are permitted to engage in insider trading.26 He
argues that allowing insider trading may lead large shareholders to seek profits not by monitoring
managers in ways that foster the interests of most investors but by using private knowledge to
expropriate the wealth of outside investors. Maug argues that allowing insider trading may
enable managers to “bribe” dominant shareholders to forego monitoring the firm when it is
performing poorly by sharing private information with them. If the firm’s stock is sufficiently
liquid, trading on such information will provide greater profits than can be gained through close
monitoring and efforts to improve firm performance. 27 Thus, firms with concentrated ownership
may desire insider trading restrictions to reduce agency costs and encourage minority
shareholders to invest in the firm. Contrary to the prediction that would seem to flow from
Demsetz’ (1986) and Bhide’s (1993) analyses, this logic implies that firms with concentrated
ownership may be more likely to adopt an ITP, thus pre-committing to restrict trading by
dominant shareholders (who, in Canada, are likely to overlap significantly with insiders) at the
expense of minority shareholders. In addition, non-insider controlling shareholders (e.g.,
institutional investors such as mutual funds, pension funds, and the like) may wish to prevent
insider trading to reduce managerial agency costs.

26

Along similar lines, La Porta et al. (1999) suggest that the primary agency problem in firms with
controlling shareholders is the expropriation of minority shareholders. The implication is that the law should be
concerned not only with preventing managerial value diversion but also with containing expropriation by large
shareholders (see, e.g., La Porta et al., 1998; La Porta et al., 1999; and Bukart and Panunzi, 2006).
27
Maug (2002) demonstrates that, conditional on the stock’s liquidity, when insider trading is legal, dominant
shareholders are more likely to collude with managers at the expense of minority shareholders in exchange for
trading profits, whereas when insider trading is illegal, dominant shareholders are more likely to monitor managers
than to trade.
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As with Hypothesis 2, we shall assume for hypothesis testing purposes that our variable
of interest here, control shareholding, correlates positively with firm policies to ban insider
trading.
Hypothesis 4: Firms with greater firm-specific stock return volatility are more likely to have an
ITP than firms with less firm-specific stock return volatility
Firms with a higher degree of firm-specific (or idiosyncratic) volatility of their stock
returns relative to the total volatility of their stock returns have a greater flow of firm-specific
news into their share prices (Morck et al., 2000; Fox et al. 2003). These firms are likely to
present more profitable insider trading opportunities than firms with relatively lower firmspecific volatility as a share of total volatility:
Firm-specific risk…is a plausible measure of the profit potential of insider
trading….High firm-specific risk firms are those whose fortunes tend to be
tied to factors that do not influence many other firms. Information about
common factors…will be known in advance to many persons in many
firms that stay in contact with capital markets. Profiting from this
information is difficult because intensive competition to do so is faced
from all who are well positioned to have the same information. In
contrast…advanced knowledge about a successful closing in a new large
contract is more likely to be restricted to persons in firms doing the
contracting. Trading on the basis of such firm-specific information is
likely to be less competitive and more profitable. It is information that
impacts the fortunes of a specific firm that provides the best opportunity to
profit. Such information is most frequently encountered in those firms
exhibiting high firm-specific risk (Demsetz, 1986, pp. 314-315, emphasis
added). 28
Again, however, the normative assessments and empirical expectations of different theoretical
perspectives conflict. One may argue that because insider trading opportunities are likely to be
more plentiful in firms characterized by relatively greater firm-specific risk, these firms will be
more prone to adopt a compliant or super-compliant ITP. Conversely, to the extent that insider
28

Consistent with this, Demsetz (1986) finds a strong positive correlation between insider trading and firmspecific risk.
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trading increases the flow of firm-specific information into stock prices (see Manne 1966;
Carlton and Fischel, 1983), restricting insider trading will result in stock prices that reflect less
firm-specific information. Firms that think that over time this will harm markets in their stock
other financial instruments may feel they would be disadvantaged by adopting an ITP, especially
a super-compliant one. In the latter case, where firm-specific volatility is endogenous to the
ITP, we may observe a negative relationship between firm-specific volatility and ITPs or ITP
strictness. 29
In addition to firm-specific volatility, we also consider total volatility, since higher
overall volatility may enable insiders to mask their trades more effectively (Kraakman, 1991). If
insiders are able to mask their trades, other things equal, insider trading will be more profitable
and therefore more likely. Again, however, we have no a priori directional expectations. Firms
with greater total return volatility may be more likely to restrict insider trading than firms with
lower total return volatility because there is a greater chance it will happen. Conversely, a lower
danger of discovery and hence scandal may make a firm less likely to adopt an ITP, particularly
since insiders who determine whether to adopt an ITP will see a good chance of avoiding
detection by external monitors in situations of high total volatility but will have more to fear if
there is internal monitoring as well.
As in other situations where the empirical implications of different perspectives conflict,
we pose our expectations in their positive form for empirical testing purposes. Thus, we
hypothesize that both greater firm-specific return volatility and greater total return volatility of
stock returns increase the likelihood that a firm will adopt a compliant or super-compliant ITP.

29

But see Beny (2005), who presents evidence suggesting that stock prices reflect more firm-specific
information in markets that have more stringent insider trading regulations. See also Fernandes and Ferreira (2007).
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Hypothesis 5: Firms that are cross-listed in the U.S. are more likely to have compliant or
super-compliant ITPs than firms that are not cross-listed in the U.S.
The “bonding” hypothesis suggests that firms from jurisdictions with weaker shareholder
protections have a strong incentive to cross-list their shares into foreign markets with stronger
shareholder protections (Reese and Weisbach, 2002; Coffee, 2002; Doidge et al. 2004). By
bonding themselves to a more stringent regulatory regime, firms may reduce their agency costs
and attract greater outside investment. Korczak and Lasfer (2006) demonstrate that insiders of
U.K. firms cross-listed in the U.S. are less inclined to trade on private information than noncross-listed U.K. firms because of their dual exposure to U.S. and U.K. insider trading
regulations. Furthermore, evidence suggests that firms cross-listed on a stock exchange in a
foreign country with a more stringent regulatory regime than in the home country are more likely
to voluntarily adopt stringent governance standards than non-cross-listed firms (Anand, Milne
and Purda, 2006). We expect a similar pattern to hold for voluntary adoption of ITPs among
Canadian firms cross-listed into the U.S. because the probability that insider trading laws will be
publicly enforced is greater in the U.S. than in Canada and, as noted above, ITPs are a defense to
corporate liability in the U.S. Canadian firms cross-listed into the U.S. also face a greater risk of
a secondary market class action lawsuits (i.e., private suits) than non-cross-listed Canadian
firms. 30 Super-compliant ITPs can be a useful defense to class actions by negating corporate
scienter, an element that must be proven in securities class action lawsuits in the U.S. (see, e.g.,
City of Monroe Employees Retirement Sys. v. Bridgestone Corp., 387 F.3d 468 (6th Cir. 2004))
but, notably, not in Canada. Arguably, the more stringent the ITP, the greater the public and
private liability shield.

30

See note 21, infra.
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Our hypotheses predict what types of firms are likely to have an ITP in the first instance
and, among firms that have an ITP, which of them will have an ITP that is stricter than Canadian
insider trading law. We test these hypotheses in Part 5 after presenting our empirical
methodology and data.
Table 1 summarizes our hypotheses.
5.

Data, Empirical Methodology, and Results

Data Overview
Our initial sample consisted of firms included in the TSX/S&P Index as of December 31,
2005. We obtained the list of firms from the Market Data group at the Toronto Stock Exchange.
We were able to collect data on 202 of the 206 firms (or 98%) in the index. We then excluded
financial firms and income trusts from our analysis, yielding a final sample of 181 firms. 31 Our
variables fall into two categories. The first category consists of variables describing whether a
firm has an ITP and the features of the firm’s ITP, if it has one. The second category consists of
various firm characteristics that we use to test our hypotheses. Descriptions of both categories of
variables follow.
Characteristics of Firms’ Insider Trading Policies
Our first task was to determine whether or not each firm has an ITP by referring to the
System for Electronic Document Analysis and Retrieval (SEDAR), which is available online,
and to firms’ websites. 32 If so, we gave the variable ITP the value one and, if not, we gave it the
value zero. We could not get reliable data on private ITPs. We assume, however, that if they
31

We excluded financial firms because this is the standard practice in the corporate finance literature (see,
e.g., La Porta et al., 1998) We excluded unit trusts because their structure differs significantly from the corporate
structure utilized by the firms in our sample. Specifically, the business of the trust continues in an underlying
operating corporation and the trust holds all of the debt of the corporation but exists primarily as an investment
vehicle whose governance structure is not regulated by corporate law.
32
The website www.sedar.com contains most of the public documents and information filed by Canadian
public companies and investment funds with the Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA) in the SEDAR filing
system. SEDAR online is the Canadian equivalent of EDGAR online for U.S. public corporations.
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exist they are few in number because they would not play the signaling role of reassurance to
outside investors or legal compliance that are likely major reasons for adopting ITPs.
After determining whether a firm has an ITP, we collected additional information on each
ITP. First, we coded whether the ITP is a separate public document or is contained in a
published code of conduct or another publicly available document. In some cases, the ITP is
described in a required disclosure document, such as an information (or proxy) circular. In other
cases, the ITP is referenced but is not described or discussed in the disclosure document.
We also recorded whether the firm’s ITP is more stringent than Canadian legal
requirements or whether it simply restates Canadian insider trading law. 33 We measure
stringency with two variables. Our first measure of ITP stringency is the variable Stringent,
which we coded as one if a firm’s ITP contains a blackout period(s), provides for the
appointment of an internal trading officer or monitor, and/or includes a procedure for employees
to apply to trade during the blackout period, none of which is required by Canadian law. 34 If an
ITP contains none of these provisions and merely mimics the requirements of Canadian law, we
coded Stringent as zero. 35 If an ITP is ambiguous or unclear for any reason (e.g., if the publicly
available documents contain only a vague description of the policy or none at all), we code
Stringent as a missing value. 36 Our second measure of ITP stringency is whether an ITP
contains a clause under which the firm can levy its own (i.e., private) penalties against insiders
who have breached the firm’s ITP or Canadian insider trading law. If so, the variable Private
33

For a review of the requirements of Canadian insider trading law, see Appendix 1.
These three characteristics are all suggested best practices in National Policy 51-101, as noted above. We
do not distinguish ITPs by the number of ways in which they exceed Canadian legal requirements.
35
For example, if an ITP contains only a prohibition on trading while an “insider” is in possession of material
nonpublic information, but no additional requirements over and above this legal requirement, we classified the
policy as being as strict as Canadian law.
36
Arguably, we should code Stringent as a zero if a firm’s ITP is ambiguous or unclear, since a firm has an
incentive to reveal that it follows a recommended best practice and to communicate extra protection to investors.
Our results do not change, however, if we replace missing values of Stringent with zero.
34
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Penalty equals one and, if not, Private Penalty equals zero. Below, we use both stringency
variables to create a more nuanced ordinal ranking of ITP stringency.
Firm-Specific Characteristics
To test our hypotheses about the kinds of Canadian firms that are likely to have ITPs, we
collected the following firm-specific information for each firm: three measures of the firm’s size
(stock market capitalization, net sales, and total assets), the firm’s market-to-book ratio, the
number of shareholders who own more than 10% of the firm’s voting shares (i.e., the number of
controlling shareholders), the total (average) percent of the firm’s voting shares owned by the
firm’s controlling shareholders (each controlling shareholder), the firm’s monthly closing stock
prices from January, 2002 through December, 2005 (inclusive), which we used to calculate
monthly stock returns and the volatility of such returns, as described below, and, finally, whether
the firm’s shares are cross-listed on a U.S. stock exchange. We downloaded the accounting
measures and information on U.S. cross-listing from the Standard & Poor’s Compustat database,
which is available online. To verify our information on cross-listing, we also checked SEDAR
and company websites, where necessary. We calculated the ownership and control variables
based on information supplied by firms through their public disclosures (proxy circular or annual
information form) that are available on SEDAR. We gathered monthly stock prices from
Standard & Poors Compustat. In a few cases, we supplemented these data with stock prices
reported by Datastream or Yahoo.com.
In our multivariate regressions we also control for a firm’s industry, as defined by the
North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) to account for the fact that firms in
some industries may be more prone to insider trading because of the nature of their assets. For
example, we expect firms with a greater proportion of intangible assets relative to total assets to
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be more likely to have ITPs than firms with a lower proportion of such assets because the former
firms are characterized by a relatively greater degree of asymmetric information, which increases
the opportunities for insider trading.37 Controlling for industry addresses this issue to the extent
that the nature of corporate assets differs systematically across industries. We use 3-digit
NAICS industry codes, which we downloaded from the online Standard & Poors Compustat
database.
Volatility of Stock Returns
As noted above, we consider two types of stock return volatility: total stock return
volatility and firm-specific stock return volatility. We measure total stock return volatility as the
standard deviation of monthly stock returns between January, 2002 and the end of 2005,
inclusive. This measure of volatility is admittedly naïve in that it does not distinguish between
stock return variation that is common to all stocks in the market and stock return variation that is
unique to a specific firm. For the reasons discussed above, we expect the latter form of stock
return volatility to have a greater influence on the incentive to engage in insider trading than
volatility that is common across all firms’ stocks. As we have noted, information that is common
to the entire market does not yield significant opportunities for profitable insider trading.
Therefore, we expect firm-specific volatility to be more strongly related than total volatility to
the propensity for a firm to adopt a compliant or super-compliant ITP.
Accordingly, our second and theoretically more important volatility measure is firmspecific stock return volatility, which is considered a proxy for firm-specific information in the
finance literature (Roll, 1988; Durnev et al., 2003). We use Roll’s (1988) methodology for
estimating firm-specific stock return volatility). The measure varies from 0 to 1, with a value of

37

Firms with a greater degree of intangible assets have greater asymmetric information because these assets
are harder for outsiders to value than tangible assets.
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1 indicating that 100% of the variation in a firm’s returns can be attributed to firm-specific
considerations and a value of 0 indicating that none of the variation in a firm’s returns can be
attributed to firm-specific factors or, equivalently, 100% of the variation in a firm’s returns is
explainable by changes in the market return. 38
We summarize our data and their sources in Table 2.
Descriptive Statistics
Table 3 presents data on the prevalence of ITPs among the firms in our sample. Of the
181 firms in our final sample, 144 (about 80%) have an ITP and 37 (about 20%) do not have an
ITP. Thus, more than two-thirds of the firms in our sample of TSX firms have an ITP.
Table 4 presents information about where our sample firms publicly document their ITPs.
An ITP may appear publicly as a standalone document, in the company’s code of conduct, or it
may be referred to in another publicly available corporate document, such as an information (or
proxy) circular. Among the 144 firms that have an ITP, such policies appear in a standalone
document in 26 cases (18%), in a code of conduct in 43 cases (30%), and by reference in another
corporate document in 70 cases (49%). Thus, the majority of ITPs in our sample are
incorporated by reference into another corporate document, like a code of conduct, and
standalone documents are the least common place where ITPs publicly appear. This
classification is relevant in terms of discerning the substantive content of the ITP. A publicly
available standalone document generally contains all of the terms of the ITP, while an ITP that is
merely referenced in another disclosure document generally does not contain the full details of
the particular ITP’s provisions.
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In brief, firm-specific stock return volatility is calculated as 1- R2 from the “market model” ordinary least
squares regression of the firm’s monthly stock returns on the market index. See Appendix 2 for a more detailed
description of how we calculate firm-specific stock return volatility.
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The reader will recall that we classify a firm’s ITP as stricter than Canadian insider
trading law if the policy contains blackout period(s), provides for the appointment of an internal
trading officer or monitor and/or consists of a procedure for employees to apply to trade during
the blackout period(s). These are suggested best practices in a national policy statement but they
are not legal requirements. In contrast, we classify an ITP as being as strict as Canadian insider
trading law if it mimics or simply restates existing law. Also recall that we ascertain whether an
ITP permits the firm to levy its private penalties (e.g., unpaid leave, dismissal, or fines) against
insiders who have breached the firm’s ITP or Canadian insider trading law. Among the 144
firms that have an ITP, we were able to determine ITP strictness (relative to Canadian law) for
138 (96% of the firms that have an ITP) and whether the firm may exact its own penalties for
violations for 143 (99% of the firms that have an ITP). Thus, we have information on both
strictness and private penalties for 138 of the 144 firms that have an ITP, or 96% of these firms.
In the remainder of cases (4% of the firms that have an ITP), the respective information was
unavailable, incomplete, or ambiguous.
Table 5 presents cross-tabulations between ITP stringency and the existence of private
penalties. Several interesting patterns are apparent in this table. First, slightly more than half
(52%) of the firms that have an ITP have an ITP that is no stricter than Canadian insider trading
law, while 44% of these firms have an ITP that goes beyond the law. Second, three quarters of
the firms that have an ITP also have a private disciplinary mechanism to enforce the firm’s ITP.
This is some, but certainly not dispositive, evidence that firms that have ITPs do not in many
instances see them as mere window dressing. Finally, 75% of firms whose ITPs demand no
more than Canadian law have private penalties, so in this sense even the ITPs of these firms are
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more stringent than Canadian insider trading law since they provide an additional, and perhaps
more likely to be realized, penalty for violation. 39
Table 6 presents summary statistics for our explanatory variables, i.e., the firm-specific
characteristics. As we expected, because they are firms in the TSX/S&P Index, the firms in our
sample are very large. Just over two-thirds 40 of the firms have a controlling shareholder and the
average number of controlling shareholders per firm is about one. For the firms for which we
could determine share ownership of the controlling shareholder(s), such shareholder(s) own an
average of 41% of the firm’s voting shares, which translates into an average of about 32% of the
voting shares per controlling shareholder per firm. 41 The average total volatility of monthly
returns between 2002 and 2005 is 13% and the average firm-specific volatility is 92% (i.e.,
general market changes explain an average of only 8% of monthly volatility of returns). 42
Panel A of Table 7 compares various firm-specific characteristics between the firms with
and without ITPs. The data are in accord with Hypothesis 1, as the firms that have an ITP tend
to be larger than the firms that do not have an ITP, where size is measured by market
capitalization, net sales, or total assets. By contrast, there is no statistically significant difference
in the market-to-book ratios of the firms with and without ITPs, and the direction of the
difference is contrary to Hypothesis 2. There is similarly no difference in the incidence of
controlling shareholders, the number of controlling shareholders, or the average percent of votes
owned per controlling shareholder between firms with and without ITPs. Controlling

39

Table 5 shows that among the firms that have an ITP, we are most likely to observe an ITP that is as strict
as the law and enables the firm to levy private penalties and we are least likely to observe an ITP that goes beyond
the law and does not provide for private enforcement.
40
This result is consistent with prior studies that find that corporate ownership concentration is relatively high
in Canada (see, e.g., Daniels and Morck, 1995).
41
Because we have so few observations on share ownership of the controlling shareholders, we do not use
these variables in the regression analyses below.
42
Although the average value of the firm-specific volatility measure (1 minus adjusted R-squared) seems
quite high, at .92, it is roughly consistent with Roll’s (1988) findings.
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shareholders do tend, however, to own a greater fraction of voting shares among the firms that
have an ITP than among the firms that do not have an ITP and the difference is significant at the
5% level, a result consistent with Hypothesis 3. Contrary to Hypothesis 4, firms without an ITP
tend to have greater total volatility in monthly returns than the firms that have an ITP, and the
difference is significant at the 5% level. Firm-specific volatility is also not associated with ITPs.
Finally, contrary to Hypothesis 5, the difference in the incidence of cross-listing in the U.S.
between the firms with and without an ITP is insignificant, though the direction of the difference
is as predicted and reasonably large.
Panel B of Table 7 compares firm-specific characteristics between the firms whose ITPs
are stricter and those whose ITPs are as strict as Canadian insider trading law. Most of the firmspecific characteristics do not significantly differ between the two sets of firms. Only the
incidence of a controlling shareholder and the number of controlling shareholders differ
significantly between these firms, consistent with Hypothesis 3. The firms with super-compliant
ITPs are more likely to have a controlling shareholder than the firms with an ITP that merely
matches Canadian insider trading law, a difference that is significant at the 10% level. These
firms also have, on average, a greater number of controlling shareholders than firms whose ITPs
are less strict than Canadian insider trading law, a difference that is significant at the 1% level.
In addition, the firms with stricter ITPs tend to have a higher average percent of votes owned per
controlling shareholder than firms with ITPs that are equally strict as Canadian insider trading
law, consistent with Hypothesis 3, but the difference only approaches significance. 43 The former
firms also have greater average firm-specific return volatility, consistent with Hypothesis 4, but
the difference is not significant at a conventional level. 44 As predicted by Hypothesis 5, the

43
44

The significance level is 11%, which is not significant at a conventional level.
The significance level is 15%, which is not significant at a conventional level.
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firms that have a super-compliant ITP are more likely to be cross-listed in the U.S. than the firms
with merely a compliant ITP, but the difference in cross-listing incidence between these two sets
of firms is insignificant. Finally, the firms with super-compliant ITPs are not more likely to have
a private penalty mechanism than the firms with ITPs that merely meet the requirements of
Canadian law.
Table 8 presents bivarate correlation coefficients for our dependent and explanatory
variables. The relationships between firm characteristics and ITP existence and stringency are as
seen in the bivariate tables, although the correlation coefficients give us an idea of the strength of
these relationships. Even when they are significant, the strengths of these correlations are low to,
at best, moderate, ranging from an absolute value of 0.01 to an absolute value of 0.25.
Interestingly, the existence of private disciplinary mechanisms bears no statistically significant
relationship to either the existence of an ITP or its strictness, nor to any of the firm-specific
characteristics. Our three measures of firm size are closely associated, as we expected, with
correlation coefficients ranging from 0.60 to 0.70 and statistically significant at the 1% level.
Market capitalization is inversely related to the existence and number of controlling
shareholders, as one may expect, but it is positively related to the votes owned by controlling
shareholders and the average number of votes owned per controlling shareholder; all of these
relationships are significant at the 5% level or better. Firm size, as measured by net sales, has no
relationship to the first two of these variables, but has a similar and somewhat stronger
relationship to the last two at a significance level of 1%. Larger firms, as measured by market
capitalization, are more likely to be cross-listed than smaller firms and the correlation coefficient
is significant at the 1% level.
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Table 8 also shows that firms with a greater market-to-book ratio are less likely to have a
controlling shareholder and, on average, have fewer controlling shareholders and less aggregate
votes held by controlling shareholders. Firms with higher market-to-book ratios also tend to
have greater total volatility of stock returns (correlation coefficient is significant at the 1% level)
but they do not have greater firm specific-volatility of returns, compared to firms with lower
market-to-book ratios. Perhaps not surprisingly, firms with controlling shareholder(s) are less
likely to be cross-listed in the U.S. As one may expect, the number of controlling shareholders is
negatively related to the average number of votes owned per controlling shareholder. The total
number of votes owned by controlling shareholders is strongly associated with the average
number of votes owned per controlling shareholder (correlation coefficient = .81). Finally, firms
with greater firm-specific volatility are less likely to be cross-listed on a U.S. stock exchange.
Our descriptive statistics provide initial insight into the types of Canadian firms that are
likely to have an ITP or an ITP that is stricter than Canadian law. They tell a mixed story. Some
factors that may be expected to be associated with compliant or super-compliant ITPs do show a
significant association but the magnitude of the association is often small and neither of the
theoretical perspectives that can motivate the hypotheses is consistently supported. Moreover,
several of the relationships we found support neither of the conflicting perspectives because they
are not significant in either direction. To check on the reliability of these results, we now turn to
our multivariate analysis.
Empirical Methodology
Ordinary Probit Regression
We shall examine two dependent variables (Y1 and Y2): for each firm in our sample, Y1
equals 1 if the firm has an ITP and 0 if the firm does not have an ITP and, for the subset of firms
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that have an ITP, Y2 equals 1 if the firm’s ITP is more restrictive than Canadian insider trading
law and 0 if it does no more than match the requirements of Canadian insider trading law. Since
both dependent variables are dichotomous, i.e., equal to either 0 or 1, we use a probit model to
estimate the conditional probability that each equals 1, that is:
Pr(Yi = 1 | X = x) = Φ ( x' β ) ,
where Φ is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution, x is a vector
of explanatory variables, and β is a vector of regression coefficients that explain the relationship
between the dependent variable and the explanatory variables. The probit model posits that the
probability that the dependent variable (ITP existence or ITP stricter than Canadian insider
trading law) equals one is a function of the explanatory variables, which in our case are the firmspecific characteristics described above.
Ordered Probit Regression
The simple dichotomization of ITP stringency above may not quite capture the relative
stringency of corporate policies. For instance, a firm with an ITP that does not go beyond
Canadian statutory requirements but provides for internal (private) sanctions may nevertheless
have a more stringent corporate policy on insider trading than a firm that has similar rules but
does not provide for internal (private) sanctions. Thus, in addition to the standard probit analysis
described above, we also conduct an ordered probit analysis, to accommodate a more refined
ordinal ranking of ITP policy options. The ordered probit model takes the following form:
Pr(Y = 1,2,3,..., n | X = x) = Φ ( x' β ) ,

where the dependent variable, Y, equals a discrete value between 1 and n, with higher values of Y
indicating a more stringent corporate policy toward insider trading. In this model, the probability
that the dependent variable equals 1, 2, 3, …, or n is again a function of the firm-specific
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characteristics described above. We describe the ordinal ranking of the dependent variable,
which is a function of both formal corporate rules and private sanctions, below.
Results
Ordinary Probit Results
As described above, we first estimate an ordinary probit regression for two dependent
variables, ITP existence and ITP strictness relative to Canadian insider trading law. The reader
will recall that we presented five testable hypotheses predicting ITP existence and stringency
(see Table 1). The first four were somewhat arbitrary in their direction as there are competing
theoretical perspectives in the literature, some of which indicate that insider trading makes firms
and markets worse off and some of which suggest it makes them better off, and these
perspectives have opposite implications for how we should expect our independent variables to
behave. We cast our hypotheses to favor the former perspective, partly for convenience sake and
partly because both the recent comparative empirical research and the fact that insider trading is
everywhere banned suggest that insider trading is economically more harmful than beneficial.
Our fifth hypothesis, that listing on a U.S. stock exchange is positively associated with ITP
existence and stringency, is more a matter of common sense than of theory since cross-listed
firms are subject to the greater liability risk than non-cross-listed firms. The explantory variables
– log of stock market capitalization 45 , market-to-book ratio, a dummy (0,1) variable for the
presence of a controlling shareholder (or the number of controlling shareholders), firm-specific

45

In the interest of space, all of the regressions reported in this section use the log of stock market
capitalization as the measure of firm size. However, the results are similar if we substitute either the log of sales or
the log of assets for the log of stock market capitalization as a measure of firm size.
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volatility of returns 46 , and a dummy (0,1) variable if the firm is cross-listed in the U.S. – test
Hypotheses 1 through 5, respectively.
Panel A of Table 9 presents ordinary probit results for the existence of an ITP. The
regressions in Columns (1) through (3) do not control for industry, while the regressions in
columns (4) through (6) do. We shall focus our attention on model 6, as it is the richest model
and, judging by the pseudo R-squares, it best explains whether a company will have an ITP. We
see from model 6 in Panel A that Hypothesis 1 is supported. Larger firms are more likely to
have ITPs than smaller firms. Perhaps this is because, while all firms may have incentives to
control insider trading, larger firms face greater problems than smaller firms in doing so because
they have more insiders. Larger firms may thus be more dependent on formal rules to control
insider trading than smaller firms. It may also be because larger firms face greater scandal costs
than smaller firms if their insiders’ trading becomes publicly known. Alternatively, the
significant results may reflect institutional factors that have little to do with the costs or benefits
of allowing insider trading. Larger firms may simply have more rules or be more inclined to
reduce their rules to writing or publicize information about their rules than smaller firms. The
size effect may also reflect window-dressing.
Hypothesis 2, that firms with higher market-to-book ratios are more likely to have ITPs
because they are more susceptible to insider trading than firms with lower market-to-book ratios,
is unsupported by the data. The market-to-book variable is significant or marginally significant
away from the predicted direction before controls for industry sector and the number of
controlling shareholders are introduced into the model.

46

We do not report the results for total return volatility in any of the regressions below and, at any rate, total
return volatility is always insignificant in our regressions.
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The results regarding Hypothesis 3, which predicts that the presence of controlling
shareholders makes having an ITP more likely, are particularly interesting. We define the
presence of controlling shareholders in two ways: first, whether there is at least one controlling
shareholder and, second, the total number of controlling shareholders. The former variable is
significantly associated with the absence of an ITP and the latter with its presence. Moreover,
the presence of at least one controlling shareholder is not significantly associated with the
presence of an ITP unless the total number of controlling shareholders is in the model. This
suggests that when there is only one or a small number of controlling shareholders, ITPs are
either thought less necessary (the controlling shareholder knows she will not engage in insider
trading) or a hindrance (the controlling shareholder seeks the rents available through insider
trading). When controlling shareholders increase in number, however, no controlling
shareholder can be sure the others will not engage in insider trading, so an ITP may be adopted
to guarantee against this. Alternatively, when there are more controlling shareholders, the costs
of insider trading may exceed its benefits to each such shareholder, since they must compete
among themselves for scarce insider trading profits. Thus, on balance, our data support
Hypothesis 3 in a somewhat more nuanced manner than we expected.
Contrary to Hypothesis 4, firm-specific volatility has no relationship to the presence of an
ITP, although once industry sector is controlled for, the relationship is in the predicted direction.
Cross-listing on a U.S. stock exchange is also non-significant, although the coefficient is positive
as predicted by Hypothesis 5.
As noted above, we hypothesize that the same factors that explain whether a firm has an
ITP also explain, for the subset of firms that have an ITP, whether the ITP goes beyond Canadian
law. Panel B of Table 9 presents ordinary probits results for ITP strictness. As in Panel A, the
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regressions in Columns (1) through (3) do not control for industry, while the regressions in
columns (4) through (6) do. Focusing on model 6, we see that the variables that explain the
strictness of an ITP, when one exists, differ from those that explain whether an ITP will exist in
the first instance. The only variable whose effect seems unchanged is the number of controlling
shareholders, which predicts both the existence of an ITP and a super-compliant ITP. Firmspecific volatility is insignificant in model 6 in Panel A for the existence of an ITP but it is
positive and significant in model 6 in Panel B for the strictness of an ITP. This suggests that,
consistent with Hypothesis 4, firms with greater idiosyncratic return volatility are more likely to
have super-compliant ITPs than firms with lower idiosyncratic return volatility.
Still comparing model 6 between Panels A and B, all other variables see their
significance reversed. Market capitalization, the size variable, and the presence of at least one
controlling shareholder, which are significant when the existence of an ITP is the dependent
variable, are insignificant when the strictness of an ITP is at issue. Indeed, the controlling
shareholder variable may as well not be in the model in Panel B, for model 5 excludes it but
paints the same picture as model 6 and has an identical pseudo R-square. Cross-listing in the
U.S. and firm-specific volatility, which are insignificantly related to the presence of an ITP in
Panel A, are significant when ITP strictness is at issue in Panel B. Finally, all relationships
except the presence of at least one controlling shareholder are in the predicted direction. We
have already given a more nuanced explanation of the latter result relative to Hypothesis 3.
Interestingly, in Panel B, when the presence of at least one controlling shareholder is in the
model and the number of controlling shareholders is not, the variable is negative and significant.
This result suggests that when a firm has at least one controlling shareholder and an ITP, the
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firm’s ITP will require no more than what the law requires, perhaps evidence of window
dressing. 47
There may be plausible explanations for some of the differences and the one similarity
between the results in Panels A and B of Table 9. Rather than attempt to explain these
differences here, however, we turn to the ordered probit results because the differences between
Panel A and B may, as we contemplated above, simply derive from the rather crude
categorization of our dependent variables in Table 9.
Ordered Probit Results
As noted above, our crude categorization of ITP stringency may not fully capture the
relative stringency of corporate policies. Thus, we construct a more nuanced ordinal ranking of
ITP stringency and use this ranking to estimate an ordered probit model. The dependent
variable, Ordered_Stringency, whose value increases in ITP stringency, equals 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5.
Ordered_Stringency equals 1 if the firm does not have an ITP, 2 if the firm has an ITP but no
provision for private sanctions, 3 if the firm has an ITP and may impose private sanctions, 4 if
the firm’s ITP is more restrictive than Canadian insider trading law but does not provide for
private sanctions, and 5 if the firm’s ITP is more restrictive than Canadian insider trading law
and the firm may impose private sanctions.
The ordered probit results are presented in column (1) of Table 10. The results in column
(1) are consistent with the results of model 6 in Table 9, Panel B, where the dependent variable is
our dichotomous measure of ITP stringency. However, they are more consistent with our
hypotheses, since they support four out of five of them. Size is now significant in the predicted
direction, whereas it is insignificant with our cruder measure of ITP stringency. The only

47

Recall that in Panel A, we find that having at least one controlling shareholder alone is not significantly
related to the presence of an ITP.
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hypothesis for which we do not find support in column (1) of Table 10 is the market-to-book
hypothesis. The results in column (1) suggest that our initial intuition about relative policy
stringency was roughly correct.
It is possible, however, that our ordinal ranking is incorrect. For instance, we deem a
firm with an ITP that is just as strict as Canadian insider trading law and private sanctions
(ranking 3) to have a less stringent policy than a firm with an ITP that is stricter than Canadian
insider trading law but no private sanctions (ranking 4). This ordering elevates formal rules over
organizational sanctions, but the latter may be more important for deterrence purposes than the
formal rules. Thus, we reverse the rankings 3 and 4. The results of this order-switching exercise
are presented in column (2). Unlike column (1), where four of our five hypotheses are
supported, only two of our hypotheses are substantiated in column (2), suggesting that our
reordered stringency ranking is incorrect. By contrast, in column (3) where the dependent
variable ranks firms solely according to their formal rules (no ITP, compliant ITP, and supercompliant ITP) and excludes private sanctions, the results are virtually identical to the results in
column (1).
Thus, it seems that firms’ formal rules governing insider trading are more important than
private organizational sanctions in producing our results. A possible interpretation is that having
an ITP that is equally strict as the law and an internal enforcement mechanism does not offer a
firm much more (e.g., in deterrence or liability avoidance) than Canadian insider trading law
already offers, while having an ITP that is stricter than Canadian law, albeit without provision
for private sanctions, offers more than existing law. This interpretation is substantiated by the
fact that cross-listing in the U.S. becomes insignificant when we reverse stringency rankings 3
and 4 in column (2). In the U.S. having a more stringent ITP (formal rule) in place is, among
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other things, a stronger defense to corporate liability irrespective of private sanctions. Another
possibility, which can support more than the compliance/liability avoidance rationale for ITPs, is
that private sanctions are less relevant than public sanctions because private parties (including
firms) are less able to detect insider trading than a public regulator with sophisticated
surveillance technology, like the SEC (Dooley, 1980). 48
Sensitivity Analysis
We impute the values of missing variables, by using both mean imputation and imputation by
regression, thereby increasing the sample size. This does not change our results. Our results
also do not change when we replace missing values of Stringency with the value 0, as discussed
in note 36.
6.

Conclusion
While voluminous, the literature on insider trading provides little empirical evidence on

firms’ motives for privately regulating insider trading in the context of the near ubiquitous legal
prohibition. In this article, we forge new ground by providing empirical evidence on this issue in
a market where insider trading laws exist but are not vigorously enforced. Using data on
Canadian firms included in the TSX/S&P Index, we attempt to understand the types, and
indirectly the motives, of Canadian firms that privately regulate insider trading in spite, or
perhaps because, of lax public enforcement.
Our data support most of our hypotheses. We find that larger firms are more likely than
smaller firms to have both an ITP and an ITP that is stricter than Canadian insider trading law,
i.e., a super-compliant ITP. In addition, we find that firms that have more than one controlling
shareholder and firms that are cross-listed in the United States, where insider trading laws are
more vigorously enforced than in Canada, are more likely to have both ITPs and super-compliant
48

Glaeser et al. (2001) address the general issue of public versus private regulation of stock markets.
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ITPs. We also find that Canadian firms whose stock returns exhibit greater firm-specific
variation, suggesting greater insider trading opportunities, are more likely to have both ITPs and
super-compliant ITPs than firms whose stock prices are more predictable based on general
market trends. Thus, with our caveat about the results for controlling ownership, the market-tobook hypothesis is the sole hypothesis unsubstantiated by our data.
Our findings have several intriguing implications. First, while we cannot entirely rule out
window dressing or the simple proclivity to enact and publicize ITPs, our results suggest there is
more to the story than that. If window dressing fully explains ITPs, most, if not all, TSX/S&P
firms ought to have super-compliant ITPs because the stronger the policy, the more attractive the
window. We find, however, that TSX/S&P firms exhibit a range of organizational approaches to
insider trading and that their choices are largely consistent with private cost-benefit
considerations. That is, both the existence and stringency of ITPs are associated with firmspecific characteristics that roughly correlate with the private costs and benefits of restricting
insider trading.
Second, our results are consistent with the compliance/liability avoidance rationale for
ITPs. The clearest support for this is our finding that cross-listed firms are more likely to have
super-compliant ITPs than non-cross-listed firms, suggesting that the stringent U.S. enforcement
regime has a non-trivial extraterritorial effect on Canadian firms. Insider trading laws are more
likely to be enforced in the U.S. against corporate insiders and firms, the latter pursuant to a
theory of derivative liability, than in Canada. Canadian firms subject to the U.S. securities
enforcement regime may shield themselves from liability by adopting ITPs and, we suspect, the
more stringent the ITP, the more powerful the legal shield, as a court may be less inclined to
disregard a maximal corporate policy than a de minimis one. A cynic may argue that the cross-
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listing effect demonstrates, at best, that firms will only do what the law requires and, at worst,
the “imperialism” of U.S. securities enforcement. 49
But compliance/liability avoidance cannot fully explain our results, nor can U.S.
regulatory imperialism. In light of the lax Canadian enforcement regime, if compliance/liability
avoidance were the sole raison d’etre of private insider trading restrictions, we would expect firm
characteristics, except cross-listing status, to be insignificant. Yet, as noted above, our data do
not show this and cross-listing is not the only factor relevant to ITP existence and stringency. On
the contrary, controlling for cross-listing status, we find that several additional firm-specific
characteristics which correlate with a firm’s risk of insider trading systematically explain ITP
existence and stringency. Having thus challenged pure window dressing and pure
compliance/liability avoidance rationales for ITPs, we interpret the residual purpose for ITPs as
the desire of at least some firms to control insider trading for economic, i.e., efficiency, reasons.
Seen in this light, the cross-listing effect may reflect voluntary bonding for economic benefits
rather than mere compliance/liability avoidance or, worse, U.S. regulatory imperialism.
Third, our finding that firms with more controlling shareholders are more likely to have
both an ITP and a super-compliant ITP than firms with fewer controlling shareholders suggests
that some shareholders, and influential ones at that, oppose insider trading. More specifically,
influential shareholders may dislike insider trading when others are in as good a position to
benefit from insider trading as they are, thereby reducing their trading profits. It also suggests
that reality may be more nuanced than Bhide (1993) and Demsetz (1986) contemplate. In
particular, controlling shareholders may prefer collectively tying their hands over competing
among themselves for dissipating insider trading profits. Alternatively, consistent with Maug’s
(2002) analysis, some controlling shareholders may be outsiders (e.g., institutional investors)
49

For a critique of U.S. regulatory “imperialism” see Romano (2001).
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who wish to keep both insider controlling shareholders and managers in check (i.e., reduce
agency costs) by prohibiting them from engaging in insider trading (see, e.g., Roulstone, 2003). 50
The latter interpretation is consistent with Beny’s (2008) finding of a positive relationship
between insider trading law stringency and corporate valuation among firms with a controlling
shareholder in common law countries. 51
Fourth, and rather gratuitously, our findings suggest that formal organizational rules may
dominate private sanctions in the present context. If so, they are more consistent with a norms or
trust theory of organizational rules (see, e.g., Blair and Stout, 2001) than with an economic
deterrence theory of such rules. Though it is intriguing, we ought not to oversell the point based
on our limited data and we leave investigation of firms’ normative attitudes to insider trading to
future research.
Finally, this article contributes to the longstanding debate about the efficiency of insider
trading regulation insofar as an influential claim in that debate is that firms do not desire to
restrict insider trading. We document that some firms do wish to limit insider trading, often
beyond what the law requires, and do so voluntarily in an environment where they face relatively
little risk of public or private enforcement. Indeed, we think that, on net, our empirical results
add to the case made by those who see insider trading as economically harmful. 52 We concede,

50

The greater the number of controlling shareholders, the more likely some of them are to be outsiders. More
cynically, dominant shareholders may prefer ITPs because they prevent insiders from trading, giving these
shareholders a monopoly on trading profits. We doubt this explanation, however, because outside dominant
shareholders’ ability to profitably trade often depends on their receiving tips from insiders.
51
Beny’s (2008) results suggest that outside investors may value the protection vis-à-vis insiders, and
possibly also dominant shareholders, that strong insider trading laws provide.
52
As noted, our data support most of our hypotheses, which predict ITP existence and stringency on the
assumption that insider trading on balance hurts firms and hurts those most vulnerable to insider trading the most.
The marginal significance or insignificance of some of our results may result from small sample size, an issue we
will correct in forthcoming research, by the possibility that our judgments about how our variables would affect the
likelihood of insider trading are mistaken, or the possibility that although our judgments about the variables’
implications are correct, firms that are more vulnerable to insider trading fail to perceive this.
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however, that our data do not prove this. 53 Still, if there are strong negative effects to insider
trading bans, as some have argued, nothing about the behavior of the firms in our data suggests
this.
This article does not just contribute to the insider trading debate. Our pilot study also
demonstrates the potential for learning more about the consequences of insider trading,
particularly as perceived by firms, and about private insider trading bans through comparative
research. To that end, we are substantially expanding our firm data to increase the power of our
tests and enable further, more nuanced analyses.
For now, the surest conclusion is that the debate will continue, spurred on, we hope, by
our findings.
–

53

In subsequent work, we will investigate the effects of voluntary ITPs on the amount of insider trading, share
liquidity, agency costs, and the propensity to cross-list into the U.S. among adopting Canadian firms.
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Table 1: Summary of Hypotheses
Hypothesis
Hypothesis
1

Summary
Larger firms are more likely to have a compliant or super-compliant ITP than
smaller firms

Hypothesis
2

Firms with higher market-to-book ratios are more likely to have a compliant or
super-compliant ITP than firms with lower market-to-book ratios

Hypothesis
3

Firms with more concentrated ownership/control are more likely to have a
compliant or super-compliant ITP than firms with less concentrated
ownership/control

Hypothesis
4

Firms with more firm-specific volatility of stock returns are more likely to have a
compliant or super-compliant ITP than firms with lower firm-specific volatility of
stock returns

Hypothesis
5

Firms that are cross-listed in the U.S. are more likely to have a compliant or
super-compliant ITP than firms that are not cross-listed in the U.S.
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Table 2: Description of Variables
Variable

Description
Variables Related to Insider Trading Policies

ITP

This variable equals 1 if the company has an ITP that is publicly available, i.e., the company’s ITP appears or
is mentioned in any paper or web-based document published on the company’s website or SEDAR, and 0
otherwise.
Source: SEDAR and firms’ websites.

Format

This variable equals 1 if the company’s ITP is a standalone document; 2 if the company’s ITP is embedded in
code of conduct or other document or there is a description of the policy in such a document; 3 if brief
reference is made to the company’s ITP but no actual ITP is available; and 4 if other or not applicable.
Source: SEDAR and firms’ websites.

Stringent

This variable equals 1 if the company’s ITP is stricter than existing insider trading law, i.e., the company’s
ITP stipulates a blackout period(s), requires the appointment of an internal trading officer or monitor, or
requires application to trade during the blackout period(s). Conversely, this variable equals 0 if the
company’s ITP is as strict as existing insider trading law, i.e., the company’s ITP merely contains a
prohibition on trading while in possession of material nonpublic information).
Source: SEDAR and firms’ websites.

Private Penalty

This variable equals 1 if the company’s ITP provides that the company will levy its own penalty in the event
of breach of the ITP or insider trading laws, and 0 otherwise.
Source: SEDAR and firms’ websites.
Firm-Specific Characteristics

Stock Market
Capitalization

This variable is the company’s stock market capitalization, the closing stock price multiplied by the number
of outstanding shares in 2005. It is a measure of the firm’s size.
Source: Standard & Poor’s Compustat.

Sales Revenue

This variable is the company’s net sales in 2005. It is a second measure of the firm’s size.
Source: Standard & Poor’s Compustat.

Assets

This variable is the company’s total assets in 2005. It is a third measure of firm size.
Source: Standard & Poor’s Compustat.

Market-to-Book
Ratio

This variable is the ratio of the company’s market value (common shares outstanding multiplied by the stock
price) to its book value of equity in 2005.
Source: Standard & Poor’s Compustat.

Number of
Controlling
Shareholders

This variable is the number of shareholders who owned more than 10% of the firm’s voting shares in 2005.

Total Voting
Control

This variable is the total percent of voting shares owned by all of the company’s controlling shareholders in
2005.

Source: SEDAR.

Source: SEDAR.
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Average Voting
Control

This variable is the average percent of voting shares owned by each of the company’s controlling
shareholders in 2005.
Source: SEDAR.

Cross-Listed in
the U.S.

This variable equals 1 if the company’s shares were cross-listed on a U.S. exchange in 2005, and 0 otherwise.
Source: SEDAR, Standard & Poor’s Compustat and firms’ websites.

Total Volatility
of Stock Returns

This variable equals the standard deviation of monthly stock returns between 2002 and the end of 2005. We
calculate monthly stock returns using the closing stock price at the end of each month between January 2002
and December 31, 2005. Closing stock prices are adjusted for dividends and stock splits.
Source: monthly stock prices come from Standard & Poors Compustat. In a few cases, we supplemented
these data with monthly stock prices from Datastream or Yahoo.com.

Firm-Specific
Volatility of
Stock Returns
Industry Codes

This variable equals one minus the adjusted R2 from the market model of stock returns. It measures the
variation in a firm’s monthly returns that cannot be explained by general changes in the market.
Source: monthly stock prices come from Standard & Poors Compustat. In a few cases, we supplemented
these data with monthly stock prices from Datastream or Yahoo.com.
These categorical variables are the North American Industrial Classification System (NAICS) 3-digit
industry codes.
Source: Standard and Poor’s Compustat.
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Table 3: Prevalence of ITPs
ITP

No ITP

Total

144

37

181

79.56%

20.44%

100%

Table 4: Where do ITPs Publicly Appear?
This table is based on information from 143 firms that have ITPs, as we were
unable to determine the location of the ITP for one firm out of the 144 firms that
have an ITP. The percentages expressed in the table are rounded figures.
Type

Number

Percent

Standalone ITP

26

18%

Code of
Conduct or
other Document

43

30%

Only Reference
to ITP

70

49%

Other

4

3%

Total

143

100%*
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Table 5: Cross-Tabulation of ITP Stringency and Private
Penalty Among Firms with ITPs

ITP Equally as
Strict as
Canadian Law
(Stringent
equals 0)

ITP More
Strict than
Canadian Law
(Stringent
equals 1)

Total Number
of Firms

Firm does not
have Private
Penalty

Firm has
Private
Penalty

Total Number of Firms

17

58

75

(12%)

(40%)

(52% of the firms that have an ITP)

13

50

63

(9%)

(35%)

30

108

138

(21%)

(75%)

(96% of the firms that have an ITP)

(44% of the firms that have an ITP)
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Table 6: Summary Statistics for Explanatory Variables
All variables are described in Table 2.
Characteristic

Number of
Observations
181

$4,900

Standard
Deviation
$7,720

Net Sales (millions)

179

$3,696.64

$5,785.19

Total Assets (millions)

179

$5,444.37

$10,881.06

Market-to-Book Ratio

168

3.31

2.81

Firm has a Controlling Shareholder
(10% or more votes) (0 or 1)

181

0.67

0.47

Number of Controlling Shareholders

176

0.95

0.95

Total Percent of Votes Owned by
Controlling Shareholders

113

41.01

27.22

Average Percent of Votes Owned
per Controlling Shareholder

113

32.35

25.40

Total Volatility of Returns (Standard
Deviation of Monthly Returns (%))

170

13.06

6.76

Firm-Specific Volatility of Returns
(1- adjusted R2 from Market Model
Regression)

167

0.92

0.13

Cross-listed in the U.S. (0 or 1)

174

0.49

0.50

Market Capitalization (millions)

Mean
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Table 7: Differences in Means
Panel A: Characteristics of Firms with and without ITPs
The superscripts a, b and c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
levels, respectively. All variables are described in Table 2.
Characteristic
Market Capitalization
(millions)
Net Sales (millions)
Total Assets (millions)
Market-to-Book Ratio
Firm has a Controlling
Shareholder (0 or 1)
( > = 10% votes)
Number of Controlling
Shareholders
Total Percent of Votes
Owned by Controlling
Shareholders
Average Percent of
Votes Owned per
Controlling Shareholder
Total Volatility of
Returns (Standard
Deviation of Monthly
Returns)
Firm-Specific Volatility
of Returns
(1- adjusted R2 from
Market Model
Regression)
Cross-listed in the U.S.

No ITP
(ITP equals 0)
(n = 37)
$1,590
(n = 37)
$1,191.1
(n = 37)
$1,412.8
(n = 37)
3.9
(n = 32)
68%
(n = 37)

ITP
(ITP equals 1)
(n = 144)
$5,750
(n = 144 )
$4,349.5
(n = 142)
$6,494.8
(n = 142)
3.2
(n = 136)
67%
(n = 144)

t-statistic
(difference in means)

0.75
(n = 36)
31.5%
(n = 24)

1.0
(n = 140)
43.6%
(n = 89)

1.42

29.0%
(n = 24)

33.2%
(n = 89)

0.72

15.12%
(n = 33)

12.56%
(n = 137)

1.97b

92%
(n = 32)

92%
(n = 135)

0.30

39%
(n = 33)

51%
(n = 141)

1.21

2.98a
3.02a
2.57a
1.29
0.10

1.95b
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Table 7: Differences in Means
Panel B: Characteristics of Firms by Strictness of ITP
All variables are described in Table 2.
Characteristic

Market Capitalization
(millions)
Net Sales (millions)
Total Assets (millions)
Market-to-Book Ratio
Firm has a Controlling
Shareholder (0 or 1)
( > = 10% votes)
Number of Controlling
Shareholders
Total Percent of Votes
Owned by Controlling
Shareholders
Average Percent of
Votes Owned per
Controlling Shareholder
Total Volatility of
Returns (Standard
Deviation of Monthly
Returns)
Firm-Specific Volatility
of Returns
(1- adjusted R2 from
Market Model
Regression)
Cross-listed in the U.S.
Private Penalty

Equally Strict
as Law
(Stringent
equals 0)

Stricter Than
Law
(Stringent
equals 1)

(n = 75)
$5,790
(n = 75)
$4,691.0
(n = 75)
$7,759.6
(n = 75)
3.08
(n = 72)
60%
(n = 75)

(n = 63)
$5,920
(n = 63 )
$4,033.9
(n = 62)
$5,309.6
(n = 62)
3.13
(n = 59)
75%
(n = 63)

0.79
(n = 75)
43.5%
(n = 43)

1.30
(n = 60)
43.0%
(n = 43)

2.98a

37.0%
(n = 43)

28.1%
(n = 43)

1.63*

12.4%
(n = 69)

12.3%
(n = 61)

0.10

90%
(n = 67)

93%
(n = 61)

1.52**

47%
(n = 74)
79%
(n = 75)

58%
(n = 62 )
77%
(n = 63)

1.25

t-statistic
(difference in means)

0.09
0.61
1.18
0.13
1.82c

0.09

0.29

*The difference is significant at the 11% level.
**The difference is significant at the 15% level.
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Table 8: Bivariate Correlations
This table presents bivariate correlation coefficients. The numbers in parentheses
are the probability levels (p-values) at which the null hypothesis of zero
correlation can be rejected in two-tailed tests. The superscripts a, b, and c denote
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. All variables
are described in Table 2.
ITP

Stricter
than Law

Private
Penalty

Stock
Market
Cap.

Net
Sales

Total
Assets

Marketto-Book
Ratio

Cont.
Sh’r.

No. of
Cont.
Sh’rs

% Votes
of Cont.
Sh’rs

ITP
Stricter than Law

1.00
0.08
(0.36)

1.00

Private Penalty

-0.04
(0.60)
0.22a
(0.00)
0.22a
(0.00)
0.19a
(0.01)
-0.10
(0.20)
-0.01
(0.92)

0.02
(0.78)
0.01
(0.93)
-0.05
(0.54)
-0.10
(0.24)
0.01
(0.90)
0.15c
(0.07)

-0.06
(0.51)
-0.03
(0.74)
0.00
(0.97)
0.13
(0.14)
-0.04
(0.61)

0.64a
(0.00)
0.60a
(0.00)
0.08
(0.31)
-0.17b
(0.03)

0.70a
(0.00)
-0.09
(0.23)
0.04
(0.60)

-0.07
(0.40)
-0.07
(0.38)

-0.13c
(0.09)

1.00

0.11
(0.16)

0.25a
(0.00)

0.04
(0.66)

-0.16b
(0.03)

0.01
(0.86)

-0.09
(0.26)

-0.20a
(0.01)

0.72a
(0.00)

1.00

0.18b
(0.05)

-0.01
(0.93)

0.08
(0.43)

0.22b
(0.02)

0.35a
(0.00)

0.23a
(0.01)

-0.24b
(0.02)

.
(0.00)

0.32a
(0.00)

1.00

0.07

-0.18

-0.01

0.29a

0.41a

0.30a

-0.11

.

-0.28a

0.81a

Stock Market
Capitalization
Net Sales
Total Assets
Market-to-Book
Ratio
Firm has a
Controlling
Shareholder
Number of
Controlling
Shareholders
% Votes
Owned
by Controlling
Shareholders
Average
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Ave. %
Votes Per
Contr.
Shr.

FirmSpecific
Volatility

Total
Volatility

CrossListed in
the U.S.

1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
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% Votes
per Controlling
Shareholder
Firm-Specific
Volatility of Returns
Total Volatility of
Returns
Cross-Listed in the
U.S.

(0.47)

(0.11)

(0.93)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.25)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

1.00

-0.02
(0.76)
-0.15b
(0.05)
0.09
(0.23)

0.13
(0.13)
-0.01
(0.92)
0.11
(0.21)

-0.03
(0.77)
0.01
(0.89)
-0.01
(0.95)

0.07
(0.37)
-0.02
(0.82)
0.22a
(0.00)

-0.04
(0.58)
-0.16b
(0.03)
0.03
(0.68)

-0.02
(0.84)
-0.07
(0.38)
0.08
(0.28)

0.09
(0.26)
0.29a
(0.00)
-0.02
(0.78)

-0.04
(0.64)
-0.21a
(0.01)
-0.17b
(0.02)

-0.04
(0.62)
-0.19a
(0.01)
-0.15b
(0.04)

-0.20b
(0.04)
-0.12
(0.24)
-0.08
(0.43)

-0.21b
(0.04)
-0.07
(0.47)
0.00
(0.98)

1.00
0.07
(0.35)
-0.24a
(0.00)

1.00
0.02
(0.81)

1.00
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Table 9: Probit Regressions
Panel A: Determinants of Having an ITP
This table presents probit regressions on the determinants of ITPs. The dependent variable, ITP,
equals 1 if the firm has an ITP, and 0 otherwise. The regressions in columns (1) through (3) do
not control for industry, while the regressions in columns (4) through (6) do. Superscripts a, b, c
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Robust standard
errors are reported in parentheses. All variables are described in Table 2.
Explanatory Variable

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Log of Market Capitalization

0.452a
(0.122)

0.473a
(0.124)

0.511a
(0.130)

0.522a
(0.128)

0.512a
(0.131)

0.565a
(0.142)

-0.078b
(0.038)

-0.066c
(0.038)

-0.067c
(0.040)

-0.066c
(0.035)

-0.057
(0.035)

-0.055
(0.038)

-1.177b
(0.599)

-0.010
(0.282)

(Hypothesis 1)
Market-to-Book Ratio
(Hypothesis 2)
Firm has a Controlling
Shareholder (0 or 1)
( > = 10% votes)

0.245
(0.264)

(Hypothesis 3)
Number of Controlling
Shareholders

0.389a
(0.143)

1.158a
(0.476)

-0.150
(1.046)

-0.118
(1.071)

-0.223
(1.048)

0.088
(0.268)

0.152
(0.275)

-8.460a
(2.836)

Industry Dummies
Number of Observations

-1.547a
(0.623)

0.272b
(0.141)

1.256a
(0.491)

0.570
(1.111)

0.592
(1.134)

0.638
(1.134)

0.125
(0.278)

0.117
(0.290)

0.170
(0.294)

0.121
(0.309)

-9.167a
(2.853)

-9.697a
(2.97)

-10.159a
(2.795)

-10.356a
(2.822)

-11.210a
(2.998)

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

155

153

153

140

138

138

Pseudo R2

0.109

0.141

0.170

0.157

0.172

0.215

χ2

20.32

26.04

27.56

32.36

31.94

38.75

Prob > χ2

0.001

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

(Hypothesis 3)
Firm-Specific Volatility
(1- adjusted R2 from Market
Model Regression)
(Hypothesis 4)
Cross-listed in the U.S.
(Hypothesis 5)
Constant
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Table 9: Probit Regressions
Panel B: Determinants of Having an ITP that is Stricter than Ontario Insider Trading Law
This table presents probit regressions on the determinants of ITP strictness. The dependent variable,
Stringent, equals 1 if the ITP is stricter than Ontario insider trading law, and 0 otherwise. The
regressions in columns (1) through (3) do not control for industry, while the regressions in columns (4)
through (6) do. Superscripts a, b, and c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. All variables are described in Table 2.
Explanatory Variable

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Log of Market Capitalization

0.0624
(0.100)

0.086
(0.104)

0.087
(0.104)

0.066
(0.109)

0.073
(0.113)

0.073
(0.113)

0.013
(0.053)

0.032
(0.053)

0.032
(0.052)

0.014
(0.059)

0.026
(0.059)

0.026
(0.058)

-0.272
(0.388)

0.727a
(0.272)

(Hypothesis 1)
Market-to-Book Ratio
(Hypothesis 2)
Firm has a Controlling
Shareholder (0 or 1)
( > = 10% votes)

0.515b
(0.249)

(Hypothesis 3)
Number of Controlling
Shareholders

0.428a
(0.133)

0.533a
(0.215)

1.808c
(0.965)

2.132b
(0.978)

2.168b
(0.980)

0.529b
(0.252)

0.655b
(0.269)

-3.733c
(2.247)

Industry Dummies
Number of Observations

-0.174
(0.410)

0.555a
(0.148)

0.628a
(0.223)

1.637
(1.089)

2.059c
(1.148)

2.121c
(1.151)

0.644b
(0.272)

0.416b
(0.270)

0.574b
(0.291)

0.572b
(0.293)

-4.784b
(2.303)

-4.755b
(2.314)

-3.426
(2.527)

-4.301c
(2.569)

-4.315c
(2.576)

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

123

121

121

123

121

121

Pseudo R2

0.059

0.105

0.108

0.151

0.201

0.201

χ2

10.52

17.07

16.06

16.11

22.48

22.10

Prob > χ2

0.062

0.004

0.108

0.097

0.013

0.024

(Hypothesis 3)
Firm-Specific Volatility
(1- adjusted R2 from Market
Model Regression)
(Hypothesis 4)
Cross-listed in the U.S.
(Hypothesis 5)
Constant
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Table 10: Ordered Probit Regressions
This table presents ordered probit regressions on the determinants of ITP strictness. In column (1), the dependent
variable, Ordered_Stringency, equals 1 if the firm does not have an ITP (ITP = 0), 2 if the firm has an ITP (ITP = 1)
but no mechanism for imposing private sanctions (Private Penalty = 0), 3 if the firm has an ITP (ITP = 1) and may
impose private sanctions (Private Penalty = 1), 4 if the firm’s ITP is more restrictive than Canadian insider trading
law (Stringent = 1) but the firm does not have a mechanism for imposing private sanctions (Private Penalty = 0),
and 5 if the firm’s ITP is more restrictive than Canadian insider trading law (Stringent = 1) and the firm may impose
private sanctions (Private Penalty = 1). In column (2), the dependent variable is the same as in column (1) except
that rankings 3 and 4 are reversed. Finally, in column (3), the dependent variable, Ordered_Formal, equals 1 if the
firm does not have an ITP (ITP = 0), 2 if the firm has an ITP that is just as strict as Canadian law (Stringent = 0),
and 3 if the firm has an ITP that is stricter than Canadian law (Stringent = 1). Superscripts a, b, and c denote
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Robust standard errors are reported in
parentheses. All variables are described in Table 2.

Explanatory
Variable
Log of Market
Capitalization
(Hypothesis 1)
Market-to-Book
Ratio
(Hypothesis 2)
Firm has a
Controlling
Shareholder
(0 or 1)
( > = 10% votes)
(Hypothesis 3)
Number of
Controlling
Shareholders
(Hypothesis 3)
Firm-Specific
Volatility
(1- adjusted R2
from Market Model
Regression)
(Hypothesis 4)
Cross-listed in the
U.S.

(1)
Original
Order
0.279a
(0.081)

(2)
Reordered
0.266a
(0.080)

(3)
Formal
Rules Only
0.311a
(0.088)

-0.020
(0.032)

-0.009
(0.031)

-0.036
(0.034)

-0.699b
(0.317)

-0.812a
(0.313)

-0.626c
(0.340)

0.737a
(0.189)

0.739a
(0.184)

0.744a
(0.200)

1.214c
(0.746)

0.824
(0.722)

1.36c
(0.789)

0.357c
(0.208)

0.329*
(0.206)

0.382c
(0.218)

65
http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art77

64

Anand and Beny:

(Hypothesis 5)
Industry Dummies

Yes

Yes

Yes

Number of
Observations
Pseudo R2

148

148

148

0.09

0.08

0.13

χ2

39.65

36.34

40.41

Prob > χ2

0.000

0.000

0.000

*The coefficient is only significant at the 11% level.
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Appendix 1: Ontario and U.S. Insider Trading Laws
Ontario Insider Trading Law
A.

Insider Trading:

Prohibited insider trading is contained in the s. 76(1) of the Ontario Securities Act. Legislation
across Canadian provincial jurisdictions is consistent with this provision (see (ASA, s. 147(2);
BCSA, s. 86(1); NfldSA, s. 77(1); and QSA s. 188).

s. 76(1): “No person or company in a special relationship with a reporting issuer
shall purchase or sell securities of the reporting issuer with the knowledge of a
material fact or material change with respect to the reporting issuer that has not
been generally disclosed.”

Note that the provision applies to anyone in a special relationship with the issuer (as noted
previously, not simply insiders as defined in the statute) who have bought or sold the issuer’s
securities. Furthermore, the knowledge must consist of a material fact or a material change and
the information cannot have been generally disclosed already. If these elements are present, then
the legislation has been breached. To be sure, the elements are as follows: (i) special
relationship; (ii) knowledge of a material fact or change; (iii) not generally disclosed.
(i)

Special Relationship

Thus, the definition of special relationship is of crucial importance. In particular, if there is a
claim against x for illegal insider trading, then x must have been in a special relationship with the
issuer. This means that x must be (in the words of the statutory definition):
s. 76(5)
(a) a person or company that is an insider, affiliate or associate of,
(i) the reporting issuer,
(ii) a person or company that is proposing to make a take-over bid, as defined in
Part XX, for the securities of the reporting issuer, or
(iii) a person or company that is proposing to become a party to a reorganization,
amalgamation, merger or arrangement or similar business combination with the
reporting issuer or to acquire a substantial portion of its property,
(b) a person or company that is engaging in or proposes to engage in any
business or professional activity with or on behalf of the reporting issuer or with
or on behalf of a person or company described in subclause (a) (ii) or (iii),
(c) a person who is a director, officer or employee of the reporting issuer or of a
person or company described in subclause (a) (ii) or (iii) or clause (b),
(d) a person or company that learned of the material fact or material change with
respect to the reporting issuer while the person or company was a person or
company described in clause (a), (b) or (c),
(e) a person or company that learns of a material fact or material change with
respect to the issuer from any other person or company described in this
subsection, including a person or company described in this clause, and knows or
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ought reasonably to have known that the other person or company is a person or
company in such a relationship. (OSA, s. 76 (5); ASA, s. 9; BCSA, s. 3; Nfld, s.
77(5); QSA, s. 189)

Without doubt, the definition is broad. People in a special relationship are not only insiders but
also parties making a takeover bid or engaged in some other proposed transaction with the issuer
(See subsection (a)(ii) and (iii)). Directors, officers and employees are caught as are people who
learned of a material fact or change from any of these people (See subsection (c)). Perhaps the
broadest part of the definition is subsection (e) in which anyone who learns of a material fact or
change from anyone described in the definition as a whole and should have known that the
person was in a special relationship with the issuer. This obligation is based on a reasonableness
standard but nevertheless potentially implicates those who learn of the information not simply
those who convey it.
Also important in understanding the term “special relationship” is the definition of “insider”:
Section 1(1) of the Ontario Securities Act, which mirrors legislation in other provinces (ASA, s.
1(aa); BCSA, s. 1(1); QSA, s. 89; NfldSA, s. 2(1)(s)) states:
s.1(1) "insider" or "insider of a reporting issuer" means,
(a) every director or senior officer of a reporting issuer,
(b) every director or senior officer of a company that is itself an insider or
subsidiary of a reporting issuer,
(c) any person or company who beneficially owns, directly or indirectly, voting
securities of a reporting issuer or who exercises control or direction over voting
securities of a reporting issuer or a combination of both carrying more than 10
per cent of the voting rights attached to all voting securities of the reporting
issuer for the time being outstanding other than voting securities held by the
person or company as underwriter in the course of a distribution, and
(d) a reporting issuer where it has purchased, redeemed or otherwise acquired
any of its securities, for so long as it holds any of its securities…

(ii) Knowledge of a Material Fact or Change
The knowledge on which the individual purchased or sold securities must meet the materiality
standard contained in the definitions of these terms in the relevant legislation. If the information
passed between individuals does not meet the materiality threshold, no claim of illegal insider
trading can be made.
A “material fact” is defined as any “fact that significantly affects, or would reasonably be
expected to have a significant effect on, the market price or value of the securities” (ASA, s.
1(gg); NSSA, s. 2(1); SSA, s. 2(1)(z); NfldSA, s. 2(1)(x); PEISA, s. 1(n)). A “material change”
is “a change in the business, operations or capital of the issuer that would reasonably be expected
to have a significant effect on the market price or value of any of the securities of the issuer…” 54

54

Ontario, British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, Newfoundland, New Brunswick and Prince Edward
Island all share this definition of material change. See discussion is chapter 6 above
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(iii) Not Generally Disclosed
The legislation does not define this phrase, but a 1976 Ontario Securities Commission (OSC)
decision suggests that two factors must be examined when determining whether information has
been generally disclosed. In Harold P. Connor [1976] OSCB 149, the OSC stipulated that the
information must be "disseminated to the trading public" and the public must then be given a
sufficient amount of time to "digest such information given its nature and complexity." In this
case, the OSC suggested that one full trading day following the release of the information should
pass before insiders trade. These two factors are embodied in National Policy 52-201 which
states:
(2) Securities legislation does not define the term "generally disclosed".
Insider trading court decisions state that information has been generally
disclosed if:
(a) the information has been disseminated in a manner calculated to
effectively reach the marketplace; and
(b) public investors have been given a reasonable amount of time to
analyze the information.

In short, the term “generally disclosed” requires one to assess whether information has been
released to the public and whether enough time has passed so that investors can analyze it.
B.

Tipping

The second aspect of illegal insider trading is referred to as “tipping”. This term does not appear in
the statutory prohibition against the activity. The relevant statutory provision reads as follows:
No reporting issuer and no person or company in a special relationship
with a reporting issuer shall inform, other than in the necessary course of
business, another person or company of a material fact or material
change with respect to the reporting issuer before the material fact or
material change has been generally disclosed. (OSA, ss. 76 (2), (3); ASA
, ss. 147(3), (4); BCSA, s.. 86(2), (3); NfldSA, s. 77(2); and QSA, s.
188).

Thus, tipping occurs if x is in a special relationship with an issuer and reveals a material fact or a
material change to y, other than in the necessary course of business, before such information has
been disclosed to the public. In this example, x is commonly referred to as the “tipper” and y is
the “tippee”. To be sure, there are three basic elements of the insider trading offence for tipping.
These are:
(1)
the tipper must be in a special relationship with the
reporting issuer;
(2)
the tipper informs the tippee of a material fact or material
change other than in the necessary course of business; and
(3) the information has not been generally disclosed.
69
http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art77

68

Anand and Beny:

As the definition of special relationship suggests (OSA, s. 76(5)(e); ASA, s. 9; BCSA, s. 3; QSA,
s. 189; NfldSA, s. 77(5) in the above example), the tippee also must know or ought reasonably to
know that the tipper is in a special relationship with a reporting issuer. This requirement
provides the tipper with a defence not available to others in a special relationship. It is important
to note also that a tippee can also be a tipper if she, like the original tipper, is also in a special
relationship with the issuer and passes material undisclosed information along to another person.
If this other person also classifies as a tipper and passes information on to yet another person, it
is easy to see how a chain of tippers can be formed. As the chain becomes longer, it becomes
more and more difficult to isolate and detect insider trading.
U.S. Federal Insider Trading Law
Rule 10b-5 -- Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities
exchange,
a. To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
b. To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
c. To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
Section 16(b) – Profits from purchase and sale of security within six months
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have been obtained by
such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his relationship to the issuer, any profit
realized by him from any purchase and sale, or any sale and purchase, of any equity security of
such issuer (other than an exempted security) or a security-based swap agreement (as defined in
section 206B of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act) involving any such equity security within any
period of less than six months, unless such security or security- based swap agreement was
acquired in good faith in connection with a debt previously contracted, shall inure to and be
recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any intention on the part of such beneficial owner,
director, or officer in entering into such transaction of holding the security or security-based
swap agreement purchased or of not repurchasing the security or security-based swap agreement
sold for a period exceeding six months. Suit to recover such profit may be instituted at law or in
equity in any court of competent jurisdiction by the issuer, or by the owner of any security of the
issuer in the name and in behalf of the issuer if the issuer shall fail or refuse to bring such suit
within sixty days after request or shall fail diligently to prosecute the same thereafter; but no
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such suit shall be brought more than two years after the date such profit was realized. This
subsection shall not be construed to cover any transaction where such beneficial owner was not
such both at the time of the purchase and sale, or the sale and purchase, of the security or
security based swap agreement (as defined in section 206B of the Gramm-Leach Bliley Act)
involved, or any transaction or transactions which the Commission by rules and regulations may
exempt as not comprehended within the purpose of this subsection.
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Appendix 2
Econometric Estimation of Firm-Specific Stock Return Volatility
To estimate firm-specific stock return volatility, we estimated the “market model” ordinary least
squares (OLS) regression of the firm’s monthly returns on the monthly returns to the market
index:
ri ,t = α i ,t + β i rm,t + ε i ,t ,
where rit is the total return on stock i in period t, rmt is the total return on the market index over
the same period, t, the α’s and the β’s are the estimated OLS regression coefficients, and εit is the
“unexplained”/unique/firm-specific component of stock i’s return in period t. We estimate the
market model using monthly returns, which we calculate from closing monthly stock prices
(adjusted for dividends and stock splits) from January 2002 through December 31, 2005. We use
Standard and Poor’s Composite TSX Composite Index as the market index. The adjusted R2
from this regression measures the fraction of the variation in a firm’s monthly returns that is
explainable by changes in the market return. 55 The remainder, i.e., the unexplained fraction of
the variation in a firm’s monthly returns, can be attributed to unique information about the firm
(see, e.g., Roll, 1988; Durnev et al., 2003). Thus, 1- adjusted R2 is a proxy for firm-specific
volatility. This is our second and theoretically more meaningful measure of stock return
volatility.

55

R2 is adjusted for degrees of freedom (see Roll, 1988).
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